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Abstract 
Academic communities have increasingly focused on China´s economic growth after its 
reforms in the late 1970s. The re-emergence of this economic superpower is greatly affecting 
several aspects of the current political-economic power balance. In order to interpret the 
ongoing developments in the international climate, we must understand how and why China 
achieved its fantastic rates of economic growth. 
 
This master´s thesis is a case study on China´s economic development after 1978, including 
the development of its economic system and industrial structure. It analyzes China´s use of 
Special Economic Zones in order to achieve economic growth, introduce capitalism to its 
domestic economy, and open up to the world. The use of SEZs has positively affected 
China´s economic growth because they allowed China to undertake economic experiments in 
controlled areas, attract foreign investors, develop and upgrade its technology, and increase 
exports. While China under Deng likely would have experienced economic growth also 
without the SEZs, their establishment speeded up the growth process. The Shenzhen SEZ is 
analyzed in detail, as it was the most successful of the initial four zones. 
 
Furthermore, China´s attempts at industrial upgrading are analyzed. It is discussed whether 
this process has been more in line with a comparative-advantage-following or a comparative-
advantage-defying development strategy. China has managed to upgrade its industrial 
structure, but it is still lagging behind more developed countries. The attempts at upgrading 
were not clearly in line with either strategy, but have featured elements of both. The 
Shenzhen SEZ is once again studied in further detail. It has developed through following its 
comparative advantages and a CAF strategy to a greater extent than China in general. 
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Terms and Abbreviations 
 
 
CAD: Comparative-advantage-defying strategy 
 
CAF: Comparative-advantage-following strategy 
 
CCP: Chinese Communist Party 
 
CDS: Coastal development strategy 
 
CSY: China statistical yearbook 
 
EADM: East Asian Development Model 
 
EPZ: Export-processing zone 
 
FDI: Foreign direct investment 
 
FYP: Five-year plan 
 
GDP: Gross domestic product 
 
HRS: Household Responsibility System 
  
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
 
JV: Joint venture 
 
R&D: Research and development 
 
RMB: Chinese Renminbi. Also know as Yuan (CNY) 
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SEZ: Special economic zone 
 
SOE: State-owned enterprise 
 
The Four Asian Tigers/The East Asian Tigers: Commonly used as a reference to South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
 
The four original/initial SEZs: Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, and Xiamen. 
 
TVE: Township and village enterprise 
 
USD: US Dollar 
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1 The Chinese Economic Miracle After 1978 - 
the Middle Kingdom´s Re-emergence as an 
Economic Powerhouse 
 
 
Chapter Outline: 
This introductory chapter presents the main elements of this master´s thesis: the topics that 
are analyzed, the thesis questions it seeks to answer, as well as its aim, scope, and structure. 
Furthermore, it lays out the choice of research method and design of the thesis. 
 
1.1 The Awakening of a Sleeping Giant 
Much have been said and written about China´s economic miracle since it’s beginning in the 
late 1970s. Practically everyone - including economic experts, commentators, scholars and 
the average citizen – recognize China´s position as an economic leader in today´s world. A 
lesser-known fact is that China´s economic transformation is not merely the tale of a 
backwards nation becoming a major economic player for the first time. China´s major share 
of the world´s gross domestic product (GDP) is no new phenomenon: it has been estimated 
that in 1820, its share of world GDP accounted for an impressive 33 %, compared to 17 % 
and 2 % for Europe and the U.S. (Bekkevold and Kristoffersen 2012: 14; Lin 2007: 18). 
Thus, China´s experiences over the last decades should perhaps not be that surprising: it is 
not just a story of its road from rags to riches, but also the tale of a glorious nation reclaiming 
some of its former pride. Being a proud people, this is of course not unknown to the Chinese, 
and in their view, what we are experiencing is a return to the normal state of things in the 
world system, at least from a historical point of view (Bekkevold and Kristoffersen 2012). 
While this aspect is important to acknowledge, make no mistake: China´s post-Deng 
experience can rightfully be claimed an economic miracle. Despite former economic 
achievements, Deng coming to power in the late 1970s in many ways mark the beginning of 
China´s modern-day industrialization and economic growth process. 
 
	  3	  
1.2 A Unique Economic Miracle 
The Chinese economic transformation is something quite unique. China´s accomplishments 
of rapid and sustained economic growth over the last three and a half decades are even more 
impressive considering the economic turmoil the world witnessed over the same period. In 
the “lost decades of development” in the 1980s and 90s, many developing countries, such as 
several Latin American states, failed in their attempts at achieving economic progress. 
Around and after the fall of the Soviet Union, many of its former states experienced 
systematic crises and economic hardships. In more recent times, the Asian financial crisis of 
1997 devastated much of the region, and the financial crisis of 2008 had a huge impact on 
every region of the world (Lo and Zhang 2011: 33). While many other countries have been 
struggling economically, China´s economy has been steadily growing, and growing at an 
impressive rate: annual growth after the economic opening up in 1978 until 2012 was almost 
10 %. In actual numbers, China´s GDP grew from USD 148.2 billion in 1978 to USD 8,227.1 
billion in 2012 (World Bank 2014). 
 
Another interesting aspect about China´s economic growth is that Chinese policy makers 
largely ignored the theories dominating the field of developmental economics when their 
country embarked on its long period of rapid, sustained growth. According to the Washington 
Consensus, an influential school of thought at the time, a country deviating so much from 
traditional free-market policies should not be able to achieve such astonishing rates of 
economic growth (Lo and Zhang 2011: 35). Due to the unique way several East Asian 
economies have developed, many scholars focus on growth-theories different from the 
traditional theories developed in the Western world. Terms such as the Beijing Consensus, 
China´s Development Model, and the East Asian Development Model (EADM) (Baek 2005: 
485; Hsu 2011: 2-3) have gained much support as it has increasingly been acknowledged that 
the Western take on economic development might not be the right strategy in other parts of 
the world. 
 
Not only does China´s recent economic growth puzzle free-market-advocating scholars and 
policy experts. More left-leaning scholars are also facing a paradox as they have been forced 
to admit that China has experienced economic growth through capitalist reforms, something 
many leftist scholars traditionally have claimed should not be possible (Lo and Zhang 2011). 
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Hence, it is clear that what China has managed to do over the last decades is something that 
has rocked the boat of several schools of developmental economic thought. 
 
1.3 Deng and His Reforms 
The event that largely marked the start of China´s economic transformation was the Third 
Plenum of the 11th Central Committee Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in 
December 1978 (Hou 2011: 421). Deng Xiaoping had defeated the so-called Gang of Four in 
the power struggle following Mao Zedong´s death (Lin 2012: 153). Deng was a visionary, 
and radically different from his predecessors. It was important for him to distance himself 
from the policies of the past, and to win support among the public. In addition, Chinese 
culture makes it hard to renounce previously pursued policies (Lin 2007). Deng played an 
important part in the launch of the economic reforms that eventually led China to where it is 
today. Now it has the world´s second biggest economy, and it is believed that it will become 
the number one economy in the near future (Jacob 2014; Riley 2014; Singleton 2014; Yew 
2013).1 The official objective of the economic reforms in China has been to create a system 
where socialism and the free market are combined, forming a hybrid system of  “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics” (Hou 2011: 420, 422). 
 
1.3.1 “Some Must Get Rich First” and Gradual Economic Reforms 
The reforms after 1978 were gradually implemented, and emphasized a dual-track reform 
approach where the market complemented the planned economy, something many Western 
scholars were highly skeptical about. Given both Deng´s political background and China´s 
history after 1949, a full-blown, free-market reformation of the economy was not an 
alternative (Lin 2012), and probably not a very good solution either. In hindsight it seems that 
the economy was reformed in the right way, especially when compared to Russia´s 
experiences with “shock reforms”. In accordance with the gradual nature of the economic 
reforms, China´s coastal regions were on the forefront of economic development, paving the 
way for the other parts of the country. Deng himself stated in one famous quote: “some must 
get rich first” (BBC News 2004). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In final stages of writing this thesis, it was even predicted that China´s economy would overtake that of the 
U.S. within 2014 (Giles 2014). 
	  5	  
This quote illustrates a developmental policy very different from that under Mao, where the 
general policy had been to establish industrial activity all over China. If anything, the inland 
areas were favored, due to factors related to the military and defense system of China and 
because the rural areas that had supported Mao’s liberation struggle were to be rewarded. 
Deng´s pragmatic development policies after 1978 led to the development of the coastal areas 
as these had the biggest potential for economic growth, with its greater experience in 
industrialization and commerce, links to rich overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, and 
convenient geographical proximity to the ocean and to the more developed areas of Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Macao (Howell 1993; Sheng 2010). The increasing inequality between 
different parts of the country has led to tensions during the course of the economic 
development. Although preferential policies were implemented in the interior parts of China 
after the mid-1980s, the Eastern parts of China developed much faster than the rest of the 
country. This difference is highly visible today, with the Eastern part of China hosting the 
richest and most modern cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen (Howell 1993). 
 
1.3.2 Special Economic Zones as Economic Laboratories and “Windows to 
the World” 
An important policy in the development of the coastal areas was the establishment of Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs). SEZs were areas with flexible and preferential policies regarding 
foreign-oriented economic activities, first tried out in selected areas of Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces in 1979. Their creation marked the start of China´s economic opening up to the 
world, and eventually several new economic zones of different types were also established. 
These zones have been important instruments in China´s economic growth strategy. After 
Deng´s famous “southern tour” in 1992, the economic liberalization was expanded to other 
areas as well (Hou 2011; Howell 1993). While the SEZs acted as tools for economic growth, 
they also played a crucial role as economic laboratories with the aim of drastically altering 
the entire economic system of China. Their creation represents the efforts of transforming the 
world´s biggest planned economy into one where the market was allowed to play a part for 
the first time under the CCP. These zones gave China the opportunity to slowly integrate 
itself in the world economy. The presence of foreign firms and capitalist policies in these 
areas was unthinkable prior to the economic reforms. 
 
1.3.3 Growth Through Exports and Foreign Investments 
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In addition to the transition from a centrally planned economy to one based more on the free 
market, China´s economic growth has been fueled by a shift of production activity from the 
low-intensive agricultural sector to labor-intensive industries, and later increasingly to more 
capital- and technology-intensive ones (Saich 2011). Products were exported to foreign 
markets, something that created revenue needed to pay for necessary imports. China managed 
to use its comparative advantage of having an abundance of low-skilled workers willing to 
work for low wages (Bjerkholt 2012). Historically, this has not been the case. When Mao 
Zedong came to power in 1949, China followed a heavy-industry-oriented development 
strategy. However, the country was scarce in capital, which were needed in the capital-
intensive industries China tried to promote. The state tried to promote heavy industries by 
giving incentives to producers, such as subsidizing the cost of capital, energy, and raw 
materials. When the heavy-industry-oriented development strategy turned out to be 
unsuccessful, and eventually the neighboring East Asian Tigers developed rapidly, China had 
to change its development strategy (Lin, Cai, and Li 2003). The result was an export-oriented 
development strategy that to a greater extent than before utilized China´s comparative 
advantages (Lin 2012). The Chinese state has actively tried to increase the export sector and 
attract FDI, as it could increase economic activity, create revenue and accumulate foreign 
exchange, and facilitate the transfer of more advanced technology and know-how. 
 
1.4 Development and Economic Growth Strategies 
There are differing views on how a developing country best can achieve economic growth. 
The growth of East Asia, and later on China, is important because the way they developed 
and achieved economic growth is contrary to developing strategies that have been influential 
in the past. Also how a developing country best can upgrade its industrial structure has been 
subject of discussion, and this is linked to the debate on the roles of the state and the market 
in economic growth. In both cases, there are differing opinions between those favoring an 
active and interventionist state, and those believing that the free market best can create 
prosperity for a country. Ideology has likely influence such views. The roles of the state and 
the market in economic growth, and how China has attempted to upgrade its industrial 
structure, is debated in depth in later parts of this thesis. 
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1.5 The Aim, Scope, and Structure of This Master´s 
Thesis 
The underlying aim of this master´s thesis is to analyze and evaluate China´s economic 
growth and the changes in its economic system. It seeks to study how the SEZs contributed to 
these developments. Furthermore, it analyzes the developments in China´s industrial 
structure, and whether the attempts at upgrading it have been in line with a comparative-
advantage-following (CAF) or a comparative-advantage-defying (CAD) strategy. 
 
This thesis can be divided into four main parts: 
 
! Chapters 1-5 cover the theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis, the 
use of Export-Processing Zones (EPZs) in developing countries, and the 
developments in the Chinese economy, first under Mao, and later after Deng´s 
reforms. These chapters are included to provide an underlying analytical framework, 
and to highlight vital developments one have to understand in order to evaluate the 
Chinese economic growth process. Important theoretical concepts and methodological 
considerations are outlined in the first chapters. How EPZs function and affect 
developing countries is discussed because it has influenced the creation of similar 
zones in China. Furthermore, it is necessary to be aware of the developments in China 
under Mao when analyzing the radical reforms launched by Deng, while Deng´s 
reforms in turn have been fundamental to China´s miraculous economic growth and 
industrial development. 
 
! Chapter 6, the first of two analytical chapters of the thesis, covers China´s SEZs. It 
lays out their creation and how they developed, as well as the government´s policies 
towards them. It continues to analyze the reasons for their establishment, how they 
benefited China´s economic growth, and their contributions to the changes in its 
economic system. The case of the Shenzhen SEZ is analyzed in-depth. 
 
! Chapter 7 is the second analytical chapter of the thesis. It covers the developments in 
China´s industrial structure, and evaluate whether China has managed to upgrade it. It 
goes on to study if the attempts at industrial upgrading have been in line with a 
comparative-advantage-following or comparative-advantage-defying strategy, and 
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two specific industries are used as examples. As in the first analytical chapter, the 
case of the Shenzhen SEZ is once again considered in detail. 
 
! Chapter 8 is a brief concluding chapter, wrapping the thesis up and discussing some 
implications for further research. 
 
1.5.1 Thesis Questions 
In order to conceptualize what this thesis seeks to analyze, two sets of thesis questions have 
been formulated; one for each of the two analytical chapters. 
 
The first analytical chapter seeks to answer the following questions: 
 
o What were the government´s policies towards the SEZs? 
o Why were the SEZs established and how did they contribute to China´s economic 
growth and the development of its economic system? 
 
The second analytical chapter seeks to answer the following questions: 
 
o Has China successfully managed to upgrade its industrial structure after 1978? 
o Have the attempts at upgrading it been in line with a comparative-advantage-
following or a comparative-advantage-defying strategy? 
 
1.6 Methodological Considerations 
When writing a master´s thesis, there are a number of methodological considerations one has 
to take into account – how the research project should be undertaken, the choice of research 
method, what type of sources one chooses to rely on, and issues related to validity and 
reliability, to name a few important elements. In this section, the main methodological 
choices of this thesis are laid out. Due to a limited amount of available space, only some 
important methodological considerations are covered. However, other methodological issued 
not mentioned here have been considered as well. 
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1.6.1 Choice of Research Method – the Case Study 
This thesis is about China, and it does not seek to generalize or compare a number of 
countries. The choice of research method depends on the problem one wants to study and its 
circumstances (Flyvbjerg 2006). As the only country of concern is China, the case study 
stood out as the most fruitful choice of research method. The case study is essentially 
qualitative, because a detailed study of a large number of cases is difficult. However, 
elements of the quantitative research method might also be included in a case study, 
something that makes it flexible (Gerring 2009). It has been argued that one cannot refer to 
“qualitative research” as a distinctive research strategy (Bryman 2004: 267). King, Keohane, 
and Verba (1994) argue that the qualitative and quantitative research methods are not as 
different as some portray them, with the same underlying logic evident in both research 
methods. 
 
A case study might be defined as “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of 
that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases” (Gerring 2009: 20).  
The concept of a “case” is a somewhat vague term, and something that might be described or 
defined in a number of ways. However, it is probably useful to attempt to define it clearly. 
Gerring (2009: 19) describes the case as “a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed 
at a single point in time or over some period of time”.  
 
This master´s thesis is a case study of China´s economic development after 1978, including 
the development of its economic system and its industrial structure. These are the 
predominant topics of the thesis. The phenomena are observed over a period of time, in order 
to evaluate how they have changed over the course of China´s development. 
 
In order to understand this, phenomena at more detailed levels are also studied. The role the 
SEZs played in the growth and development of the Chinese economy is studied. Furthermore, 
China´s attempts at industrial upgrading are analyzed, evaluating whether these most 
resembled a CAD or a CAF strategy. The Shenzhen SEZ is studied in greater detail, in order 
to illustrate how one specific SEZ has developed and benefited China in the pursuit of its 
developmental goals. These elements are included because they contribute to shedding light 
on the main topic of the thesis. 
	   10	  
 
The Case Study and Possibilities of Generalization 
Flyvbjerg (2006: 224) argues that the view that case studies cannot be generalized is a 
common misconception about this type of research method. This is a valid point, and there 
might be too much skepticism about the ability to generalize from a case study onto a larger 
population of cases. It might be argued that any single case is a study of a broader class of 
cases or phenomenon (King et al. 1994). This master´s thesis might be viewed as a case study 
on economic development, and it does present knowledge and evidence that both supports 
and object to other models of development. 
 
At the same time, one should be reluctant to assume that the results of a case study of a 
limited scope might be readily applied to a larger population of cases. Furthermore, not 
everyone believes that generalization in itself should be the goal of a case study. It has been 
argued that generalization is overrated as the main driver of scientific progress, and that it is 
important to value the findings of small-N case studies without the goal of generalization. 
Flyvbjerg (2006: 227) states: “a purely descriptive, phenomenological case study without any 
attempt to generalize can certainly be of value in this process and has often helped cut a path 
toward scientific innovation”. 
 
As is discussed further in the theoretical chapter, the experiences of both the East Asian 
region as a whole, and each of its individual countries, has to be viewed in light of the unique 
conditions of the respective country. That is not to say that no similarities exist. Elements of 
the developmental experience of the East Asian economies can be applied to China, and the 
concept of an EADM is not without its applicability. Likewise, some of the past and current 
developments of China can possibly be used to analyze other developing countries of the 
world. If this is something one attempts, a high degree of skepticism and caution has to be 
kept in mind. While generalizing from China´s developmental experience to other developing 
countries is not the aim of this thesis, future research on how developing countries can 
achieve economic growth might benefit from an evaluation of the Chinese developmental 
experience. 
 
The Case Study is Valuable in Itself 
A misunderstanding about the case study is that it is most useful in the early steps of the 
research process, and that the application of other research methods are more fruitful later in 
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the study. Additionally, it has been claimed that it is difficult to summarize and develop 
general theories on the basis of specific case studies, and that the case study is often viewed 
with suspicion and sometimes even described in lesser terms than more statistical research 
methods. The case study is valuable in itself, even if one does not attempt to generalize its 
findings, and it should not be limited to only generating hypotheses in the beginning of the 
study, as it may be fruitful in other parts of the study as well. The case study makes up a large 
degree of the research being produced by scientists, and it continues to generate new insight 
into the social sciences (Flyvbjerg 2006; Gerring 2004). 
 
Why the Case Study Method Was Chosen 
This thesis seeks to extensively analyze some important elements of China´s economic and 
industrial transformation. I do not attempt to compare a number of countries, and I feel a 
more purely quantitative research method would not have allowed me to study China as 
intensively as I desired. Using the case study method gave me flexibility, and I feel the 
lacking availability of statistics on China could have presented a problem if a more 
quantitative-oriented research design had been chosen.  
 
Conducting interviews or doing fieldwork in China was also something I chose not to do. I 
believe it would have been difficult getting access to policy experts in China, and get them to 
talk freely about my matters of interest. I considered a case study relying on written sources 
the right choice of research method for this thesis, and it allowed me to study my 
phenomenon of interest as intensive and extensive as I desired. Furthermore, the available 
data material on the topics of this study is limited. Hence, I believe the best choice of 
research strategy was to conduct qualitative assessments of the empirical phenomena I 
observed. 
 
1.6.2 Choice of Sources 
This master´s thesis uses written sources, such as books, reports, papers, statistical databases, 
and articles from academic journals2. It is about broad and complex themes, and relying on a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Statistics from the Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2011 is used in later parts of this thesis. It is not specified 
whether this book refers to the Shenzhen SEZ, or the city of Shenzhen. The publisher has not responded to my 
inquiry. However, it is natural that most of the economic activity going on in Shenzhen city was a result of the 
SEZ, as the city was small and not very developed when the SEZ was established. Thus I believe the Shenzhen 
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large variety of sources was necessary. Understanding such multi-faceted topics as China´s 
economic and industrial developments over several decades requires vast amounts of 
information, and analyzing documents enabled me to a study these topics from a number of 
angles. It also ensured that I could gather the information I needed for each part of the thesis, 
which covers several lower-level research topics, such as the Chinese economy under 
different leaders and economic systems, the use of EPZs and SEZs, and various strategies 
aimed at economic and industrial development. 
 
This thesis is based on various forms of written sources, and the different types of documents 
have complimented each other. When developing the theoretical and analytical framework, I 
relied to a large extent on books, and the empirical data was to a bigger degree gathered from 
less theoretical journal articles. I have also utilized conference and working papers discussing 
various aspects of the phenomena I analyze, and statistical books have provided me with the 
data needed to illustrate my findings. I believe the choice of documents as my primary 
source, and the types of documents I relied on, allowed me to use empirical data to exemplify 
and compliment the theoretical framework this thesis is founded on. 
 
1.6.3 Validity 
Validity and reliability are important concepts in all kinds of research. These are broad and 
somewhat vague concepts concerning many elements of the quality of a research project. 
Skog (2010: 87) claims validity is about “avoiding research-related pitfalls” (my translation). 
One can refer to several different aspects of a research process when using the term 
“validity”, such as the validity of measurements, how a study is designed, how one interprets 
data, or how one generalize one´s findings (Skog 2010). Validity is not an absolute term. One 
has to strive to achieve the highest possible validity in a study, but perfect validity can hardly 
be expected.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Statistical Yearbook 2011 is useful, even if it happens to cover a larger area than just the SEZ itself. The general 
pattern of Shenzhen´s economic development would nonetheless be portrayed sufficiently correct even if the 
numbers in the Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2011 were representing a somewhat different area. Additionally, 
there is no better statistical resource on Shenzhen available. Using a statistical book from a larger area, for 
example the entire Guangdong province, in order to illustrate developments in the Shenzhen SEZ, would pose a 
much bigger problem. 
	  13	  
While there are several types of validity, the two types relevant for this thesis is external and 
internal validity. External validity is concerned with the ability to generalize from the 
findings of a case study, something that has been discussed earlier in this chapter. The ability 
to generalize is viewed differently by the individual scholar. One can argue that combining 
specificity and generality is not possible (Gerring 2009). While one should be cautious when 
attempting to generalize from the findings of a case study, many cases might also be viewed 
as part of a bigger population of cases (King et al. 1994). This master´s thesis is a case study 
on economic development, and future research might be able to draw on its conclusions. 
However, the case of China´s economic development is unique, and this has to be kept in 
mind if one attempts to generalize its experiences onto other cases of developing economies.  
 
Internal validity is about the relationship between cause and effect. The findings of a research 
project has to be the result of the operationalization of the study, and high internal validity 
requires that a study measures what it claims to be measuring, and present findings that are in 
accordance with reality (Lund 1996). An experimental study can allow the researcher to 
conduct experiments under controlled circumstances. However, in other types of studies the 
researcher cannot control the external environment. Hence, one cannot know for certain that 
the internal validity is sufficiently high (Skog 2010). 
 
Finding indicators of economic performance is always difficult when studying an 
undemocratic and non-transparent state like China, and one has to be careful when relying on 
official statistics. However, one does not have the liberty to cherry-pick statistics from a 
range of sources, and one certainly cannot lean on the highly developed websites of statistical 
bureaus like the Norwegian SSB. Some of the data I use in this thesis are based on a 
universally acknowledged source like the World Bank. Data is also gathered from various 
Chinese statistical yearbooks, and to a lesser extent from second-hand sources like books and 
renowned academic journals using official Chinese statistical resources, in those cases where 
the primary source was not available to me. 
 
The data availability on the topics I study presents a challenge to the validity of this thesis. I 
had to use the data that was available to me, but the available data is not necessarily what 
allows me to answer the thesis questions I present. I do believe the data in this thesis can be 
used to shed light on the topics being studied. However, ideally there would have been a 
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larger amount of data and statistics available to me. This could have increased the validity of 
this study. Unfortunately, the data a researcher desires is not always available to him or her. 
 
1.6.4 Reliability 
Reliability is about issues of consistency of measurements (Bryman 2004). This means that a 
different researcher should be able to replicate a study, or collect the same data at a later 
point in time. Reliability is also concerned with such elements as a correct operationalization 
of variables, collection of data, and coding. This is generally more relevant in a quantitative 
study. In relation to this concept, perhaps the main issue I encountered was using official 
Chinese statistics, which is discussed further in the next section. A researcher conducting a 
similar type of study at a later point in time could come to the same conclusions as I have, 
although how one personally evaluates the data material would affect the findings and 
conclusions of such future studies. However, a future study with a different conclusion would 
not necessarily present a problem to the reliability of this study. 
 
It is of my opinion that the research I have conducted has a sufficiently high degree of 
validity and reliability. I have critically reviewed every source I have used, and continuously 
strived to avoid common mistakes often encountered when conducting research. I believe my 
results are in accordance with what I initially wanted to study, and I feel I lay out a clear and 
correct picture of the actual happenings in China over the past decades.  
 
The Reliability of Official Chinese Data 
Determining the reliability of official Chinese data is not an easy feat. Although it is not 
ideal, for the most part the only publisher of relevant economic data from China is the 
Chinese government itself. Naughton (2007: 141) states that “no one has ever demonstrated 
that the extensive Chinese numbers published are mutually contradictory or inconsistent with 
externally verifiable facts”, and there are no real alternative sources of data. Hence, one has 
few other options than to use the available official data. 
 
The main problem with the official Chinese statistics, in my view, is that they are coming 
from a non-democratic government not exactly known for its transparency. One cannot 
simply take for granted that what it publishes is reliable, and one has to keep in mind that its 
main function is not necessarily to provide the public with accurate information, but rather to 
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make the CCP and the way it runs the country look good. Especially local GDP statistics 
have been criticized, often reporting numbers inconsistent with national figures (Schiavenza 
2013; Scissors 2014). Another problem is that China is a country in transition and also a 
developing country, and in such countries statistical errors are often a problem because of the 
big changes they are undergoing (Naughton 2007). 
 
Chow (2006) is of the opinion that official Chinese statistics generally are reliable. He puts 
forth a number of arguments to prove why this is the case. He argues that the staff producing 
the yearly-published China Statistical Yearbook (CSY) is required by law to provide accurate 
statistics. He goes on to claim that reports presented by the Chinese Premier are based on 
official statistics, information that is used for planning purposes and are “subject to review” 
by international observers (Chow 2006: 397) and “under the scrutiny of the entire world” 
(Chow 2006: 398). Furthermore, official Chinese statistics have been used in numerous 
articles published in academic journals. Based on these arguments, he concludes that “official 
data are by and large reliable” (Chow 2006: 412), based on his own experiences. 
 
In my view, these arguments are too simplistic. The first argument is problematic. Even if 
Chinese law is requiring the staff publishing the CSY to put out accurate statistics, the 
Chinese legal system is not exactly renowned by judicial experts in other countries. One 
cannot know for certain that Chinese statistics are reliable simply because laws state that they 
should be. The second argument might have more too it, as China naturally would not want 
to base its national plans on false statistics. Still, if the Chinese leadership did indeed present 
false information, they would obviously use accurate data instead when planning the nation´s 
future, and not rely on information they knew were inaccurate. Furthermore, the entire world 
isn’t studying every official Chinese report to the extent the author claims. The last argument 
is true – official Chinese statistics are used all the time in renowned academic journals – but 
this has likely as much to do with the limited availability of Chinese data, as with the trust in 
official Chinese statistics. Fernald, Malkin, and Spiegel (2013: last paragraph) have 
developed alternative estimates of China´s GDP growth, and can also be said to be somewhat 
supportive of official Chinese statistics. They find that Chinese growth has been “in the 
ballpark of what official data have reported”. 
 
While Chow supports the validity of official Chinese statistics, numerous other scholars do 
not. Nakamura, Steinsson, and Liu (2014) suggest that official Chinese data are smoother 
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than what they really are, overstating inflation and understating growth when inflation was 
low in the 1990s, and understating inflation while overstating consumption growth in the 
following decade. Rawski (2001) believe Chinese GDP data are exaggerated. The accuracy 
of official Chinese statistics is questioned in Rawski and Wei (2001) and Holz (2004). Wang 
and Meng (2001) find that China´s industrial growth was over-reported in the 1990s. 
 
Interestingly, in 2007 Li Keqiang supposedly claimed that Chinese GDP statistics was man-
made and unreliable. At the time, he was head of the CCP in Liaoning province. Obviously, 
this was not something he publicly claimed, but rather a confidential memo leaked by 
WikiLeaks (Reuters 2010; Wikileaks.org 2007). Li is today the Premier of China and the 
Party Secretary of the State Council. A major issue is the lack of alternative statistics on 
Chinese economic indicators, such as GDP. Alternative measurements have been developed, 
but these are estimates. Some of these alternative graphs are based on what Li in 2007 said 
could better illustrate economic activity; electricity production, rail cargo shipments, and loan 
disbursements (Fernald et al. 2013). While these low-profile statistics might be more reliable 
than the more important GDP figures, they are still Chinese statistics, so in that sense we are 
back to square one. 
 
The bottom line is that one does not have many other options than to use the official statistics 
presented by the Chinese government, always analyzing them skeptically. Official data are 
widely used in various publications in need of statistics on China. Despite the criticism of 
official numbers, I still think they can be used to illustrate broad developments in the growth 
of the Chinese economy. 
 
Using GDP as a an Indicator of Economic Activity 
This thesis use broad and general economic statistics, such as GDP, to illustrate the main 
developments in the Chinese economy. Many scholars have criticized the use of GDP figures 
to illustrate economic activity3. It is not a very substantial indicator, but it can illustrate the 
main trends of how an economy performs. The main goals of this thesis is to show how the 
Chinese economy has developed, how the SEZs has affected this growth, and how China has 
attempted to upgrade its industrial structure. Using general indicators like GDP growth and 
FDI inflows is useful in this regard. If this thesis sought to explain the developments of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See for example Schiavenza 2013 and Scissors 2013. 
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narrower field, say the performance of a particular industrial sector, in one single province, in 
the course of one year, GDP figures would obviously not suffice. In illustrating general 
economic trends, however, I think they can be useful. 
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2 The Roles of State and Market in Economic 
Growth, the East Asian “Miracle”, and 
Technological-Industrial Upgrading 
 
 
Chapter Outline 
This theoretical chapter puts forth the underlying theoretical framework this thesis is founded 
on. It considers the debate around the roles of the state and the market in a country pursuing 
economic growth, and lays out some of the dominant views in this debate. The chapter 
reflects on the theory of comparative advantage, and puts forth two different opinions on 
whether a country should seek to follow or strategically defy its comparative advantages 
based on its factor endowment structure. 
 
2.1 The Role of the State in Economic Growth 
How might a state facilitate economic growth, create prosperity, and ensure the welfare of its 
citizens? It would not be an exaggeration to claim that it is not only one of the central 
questions of political economy and political science, but also a fundamental element in the 
essence of the modern political system. The role of the state in the never-ending struggle for 
increased prosperity, wealth and financial security is something that has been debated and 
studied for many years, and something that will continue to puzzle policy makers and 
economists long after our time (Zhang 2002). 
 
States have played, and continue to play, vital roles in the economic situation of the 
geographically defined entity they control. An authoritarian state like the Chinese can 
influence its economy more than a democratically elected government, due to its increased 
autonomy in internal affairs and absence of having to answer to an electorate. With an 
increasingly globalized world economy, a state wanting to succeed economically has to take 
international conditions into account. Ignoring world markets and economic realities will lead 
to a certain death, economically speaking. The isolated state of North Korea is just one 
example of what ignorant economic policies can lead to. 
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China stands out as a particularly interesting case when trying to understand the role of the 
state in economic growth, and how it is influenced by the world economy. With its fantastic 
economic growth over the past decades, it has established itself as a major economic player, 
estimated to overtake the U.S. and become the world´s biggest economy in the near future 
(Jacob 2014; Riley 2014; Singleton 2014; Yew 2013). Not only is its history fascinating, so is 
its future: it has the world´s biggest population and its third biggest land mass, and major 
social, environmental and political challenges. The ruling CCP is determined to stay in power 
while experiencing some of the most drastic changes in the country´s long history. 
 
2.2 The Debate on State Versus Market 
China is a strong, authoritarian, one-party state where the CCP controls most aspects of both 
daily life and the broader directions the country is moving in. The degree of state 
involvement in the economy is high, and more tolerated than in for example the U.S., where 
many look upon the government with suspicion. Despite the difference in government 
involvement in the respective economies of various countries, one can argue that the state 
plays some role in any economy, regardless of ideology and history. Evans (1995) argues that 
state involvement in the economy is a question of what kind of involvement, and not how 
much. He wants the debate to revolve around different types of state involvement in 
economic affairs, rather than being about whether the market or the state should lead a 
country to wealth and prosperity. 
 
The debate on the respective roles the state and the market should play in economic 
development has been going on for decades. The free-market, neo-liberal view, and that 
favoring a more interventionist state, has been among the most influential and visible in the 
debate. These opposing views are especially interesting in light of the experiences of the East 
Asian “miracle” economies, which in the eyes of many proved that the neo-liberal approach 
to economic development was not the best for developing countries to follow. This debate 
might not be as relevant today as it was in the 1980s and 90s, but it is useful to take it into 
consideration when analyzing state involvement in the economy. It has influenced policy 
makers and scholars, as well as the advice given to developing countries looking to prosper 
economically. When studying China, it is hard to overlook the experiences of its neighboring 
East Asian countries. These countries learned much from experimenting with economic 
policies, and have influenced China´s economic policies to at least some extent. 
	   20	  
 
In the 1950s and 60s, the view on how underdeveloped states could achieve economic growth 
was dominated by structuralist theories. Many saw the state as an important factor that 
needed to intervene in the economy and repair market failures. The ideas of scholars such as 
Alexander Gerschenkron and John M. Keynes were given much attention - ideas prescribing 
the need for government interventions in developing countries in the case of Gerschenkron, 
and in developed countries in the case of Keynes. By the early 1970s, free-market theories 
gained momentum as many Latin American countries failed to develop despite an activist 
state. However, as the decade came to an end, the success of the East Asian “miracle” 
economies in turn presented a challenge to such theories (Chu 1997: 3-4; Wade 1990: 8-10). 
 
2.2.1 The Washington Consensus 
After the failures in the economic policies of many Latin American countries, the 
Washington Consensus gained momentum in the 1980s. It prescribed policies for developing 
countries seeking to achieve economic growth, strongly supporting the free market and a 
non-interventionist state apparatus. The term is a reference to the city where such institutions 
as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the U.S. Treasury 
Department are located (Oatley 2012: 150). From the 1970s, the Bretton Woods-esque policy 
recommendations of the Washington Consensus dominated economic policy in developing 
countries. The main elements of the Washington Consensus were that economic development 
best could be achieved if the market were given the chance to operate freely, with a 
government mainly limiting itself to such tasks as providing infrastructure, securing law and 
order, and ensuring a stable macroeconomic environment. State intervention was mostly seen 
as something negative, and market failures were deemed less harmful than failures by the 
government. A key idea was that developing countries had to “get the prices right” and that 
politicians concerned about their own interests, leading to corruption and rent seeking, had to 
be restrained (Onis and Senses 2005). 
 
In the beginning of the 1990s, the ideas associated with the Washington Consensus were 
starting to lose support. The empirical evidence did not support the fundamental idea that 
complete market liberalization would lead to economic growth. A country like Argentina 
adhered to the neo-liberal policies of the IMF, but after a period of success found itself in a 
major economic crisis at the beginning of the 21st century (Onis and Senses 2005: 269). The 
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East Asian and Latin American financial crises at the end of the century did not exactly 
strengthen the theories of the Washington Consensus, and many of its policy 
recommendations, such as reliance on foreign capital, were discredited. For many developing 
and middle-income countries, it was problematic that they opened up to financial 
liberalization, due to pressure from international institutions, before they had the necessary 
macroeconomic stability in place (Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011; Onis and Senses 2005).  
 
2.2.2 The East Asian “Miracle”: Growth With an Interventionist State 
The experiences of the East Asian Tigers from around the 1970s onward showed that 
development strategies other than those recommended by the Washington Consensus had to 
be taken into consideration. Countries such as South Korea, Singapore, and Japan, as well as 
the Chinese areas of Hong Kong and Taiwan, managed to achieve astonishing rates of 
economic growth in the 1970s-1990s (Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011). The East Asian 
“miracle” has been intriguing to economists and political scientists over the past decades. Not 
only did the East Asian countries experience economic growth at unprecedented levels, but 
also the way they did so were contrary to many of the dominant theories on economic 
development at the time. Additionally, the economic growth in East Asia happened at a time 
when the majority of developing countries experienced a slower rate of economic growth 
than high-income countries (Kwon and Kang 2011).  
 
Neo-liberal scholars claimed the achievements in East Asia were the results of free-market 
and outward-oriented policies, pointing to how developing countries with protectionist 
economic policies were less successful (Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011). On the other hand, 
many experts have argued that the East Asian “miracle” specifically proved that neo-liberal 
policies were not working and not the best strategy for developing countries to follow. The 
World Bank published the report “The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public 
Policy” in 1993 with the goal of proving the correlation between neo-liberal policies and 
economic success in East Asia, a report that has been the subject of much debate and scrutiny 
(Onis and Senses 2005: 266; Tenold 2012: 64). In many respects, the way the report 
explained how the newly industrialized countries had achieved economic growth was more 
balanced and moderate than what the World Bank had typically preached. Although crediting 
the East Asian governments in no way was groundbreaking in itself, the source it came from 
was somewhat surprising. The report acknowledged that the high-performing Asian 
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economies did have extensive government interventions, and that it might have been a factor 
contributing to the high economic growth rates (Evans 1995; Rodrik 1994). The East Asian 
governments got the fundamentals right, and created a stable macroeconomic environment 
with low inflation and small fiscal deficits, while they at same time enjoyed political stability 
(Chang 2006; Page 1994). Total factor productivity was high and they managed to utilize 
their resources in a much better way than what had been evident in other developing 
countries. They became internationally competitive and took advantage of foreign technology 
and knowledge that had already been developed in the West. This rapid growth was 
combined with a high level of income distribution, so that bigger parts of the population were 
able to reap the benefits of the economic growth (Page 1994; Perkins 1994; Wang 2011). 
 
Neo-liberal theories have to a bigger extent been utilized as an explanation for economic 
growth in the Tiger economies than in China, because China developed at a later stage when 
the ideas of the Washington Consensus had been criticized and somewhat discredited. This 
does not mean that explaining China´s economic development is an easy feat, and there is far 
from consensus on this topic among scholars and economists. China is much bigger in both 
population and size than the East Asian Tigers, has a greater potential, and is a more 
powerful player in the world economy today than South Korea or Japan ever were. Hence 
one should be careful when trying to analyze China in light of what the East Asian “miracle” 
economies achieved. China represents something quite unique and this should be kept in 
mind. However, there are also similarities between the developments of the East Asian Tigers 
and China, and one can draw on some of the experiences of the former when analyzing the 
latter. The experiences of the Tiger economies have likely had at least some influence on 
China´s past economic policies. 
 
Baek (2005) argues that China´s economic development does have features in common with 
an East Asian Development Model, and others argue that China is best explained in light of 
the earlier developers in East Asia (Kwon and Kang 2011). Many of the typical features of 
the EADM have been important in China, such as a reliance on export, imports of foreign 
technology, investments in research and development (R&D), an abundance of cheap labor, 
and “getting the prices wrong” (Kwon and Kang 2011). Exports created profits, but it was 
also important to export in order to be able to import. Exports generated revenue of foreign 
currency, enabling the import of components necessary in the production of exports. Both the 
Tigers and China had high levels of investments and savings, promoted general and selective 
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industrial policies, and relied on central planning. There was also a shared focus on a stable 
and reasonable macro-economic environment (Baek 2005; Tenold 2012). 
 
2.2.3 No East Asian “Miracle” at All? 
Some seem to prefer that a certain path to economic growth should be adopted by developing 
countries, regardless of unique and country-specific conditions. Not everyone agree that such 
concepts as the East Asian “miracle” or the Washington Consensus can be applied to 
developing countries in general. Economists such as Paul Krugman, among others, have 
opposed the entire notion of an East Asian “miracle”. Instead of prescribing a certain strategy 
for development, it is argued that what happened in East Asia was simply the result of an 
increment in labor and capital, two important factors in economic development (Tenold 2012: 
66). Ranis (1995) argues that both the free market and government interventions contributed 
to the economic development of East Asia. He points to how the labor market was allowed to 
behave competitively with little government interference. At the same time, the government 
supported R&D, facilitated infrastructural development, reduced transaction costs, and 
strengthened intellectual property rights, but managed to stay flexible in reform 
implementation, letting the free market operate to a necessary extent. 
 
2.2.4 Rejecting General Development Strategies 
Gerschenkron rejected the notion that different cases of development should be viewed in 
light of the same set of existing conditions. As opposed to those claiming that a certain 
strategy is the most efficient for economic development, he argued that countries could not 
replicate the development process of other countries (Hobday 2003: 294). Developing 
countries, or latecomer economies, had to take into account the experiences of others, while 
at the same time follow their own path. The unique conditions of “backward” economies 
should determine the state´s role in areas such as technology development, institution 
building, resource mobilization, and so on. According to convergence theory, backward 
economies have a huge potential for rapid economic development. They can utilize already 
developed technologies, and the larger the gap between the developed and the developing 
countries, the bigger the potential for growth in productivity. Given that certain conditions 
are in place, the laggard economy will grow faster than those more developed, and converge 
towards their level of development (Abramovitz 1986; Abramovitz and David 1996).  
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Evans (1995: 11) has also argued that developing countries should not follow a certain 
standardized, ideologically influenced development strategy, stating that “different kinds of 
state structures create different capacities for action. Structures define the range of roles that 
the state is capable of playing. Outcomes depend both on whether the roles fit the context and 
on how well they are executed”. It might be more fruitful for the developing countries of 
today to draw on the experiences of other countries, trying to extract the positives and avoid 
the negatives, while simultaneously taking into consideration their unique conditions, 
resources, and historical and cultural backgrounds. 
 
2.2.5 “Embedded Autonomy” in East Asia 
There is no denying the fact that some East Asian countries have achieved tremendous rates 
of economic growth over the past decades. As the discussion so far in this chapter has shown, 
one should be careful in trying to explain the East Asian growth experience with 
ideologically grounded theories supposed to fit a number of countries with entirely different 
starting points.  
 
That being said, is it possible to point to some main reasons behind the economic growth of 
the Tiger economies? One can point to the increment in capital and labor, like Krugman has. 
Evans (1995) claims a state might be labeled “developmental” when “embeddedness” and 
“autonomy” are combined. The state needs autonomy in order to discipline the private and 
the business sectors. This includes a bureaucracy being insulated enough to performs its tasks 
on behalf of the state, while at the same time being sufficiently competent. It must be able to 
perform its responsibilities and withstand pressure from private businesses, lobby groups, and 
other actors with differing interests. However, such insulation and capacity without concern 
for private actors is probably not ideal either, and there needs to be a connection between the 
state and the private sector, with information flowing between the two (Chu 1997: 9). 
“Embedded autonomy” might be one common factor in the economic growth of different 
East Asian countries. The state recruited some of the brightest minds to their bureaucracy, 
provided capital and helped private firms to compete in international markets, and was 
assisted by elite economic policy organizations (Evans 1995). Their bureaucrats were not 
rent-seekers, but rather skilled managers of industrialization, and the government was quite 
selective in its interventions in the economy (Chang 2006; Zweig 2002). Although China is 
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not specifically mentioned, I would argue that much of this embedded autonomy has been 
evident in China, too. 
 
2.3 Technological and Industrial Catching-up: Following 
or Defying Comparative Advantages? 
As opposed to developed countries, developing countries will typically have a factor 
endowment structure where unskilled labor, and sometimes natural resources, is relatively 
abundant, coupled with a scarcity of capital. The abundance or scarcity of land and natural 
resources are usually given, as it is hard for a country to increase its geographical size (Lin 
2007; Lin 2012). It can be argued that the abundance of natural resources may be increased, 
but generally, this factor endowment is also static. The natural factor endowment structure of 
a country can say something about in which types of industries it will have a comparative 
advantage. According to the theory of comparative advantage, the endowment structure of 
developing countries is the reason why following a development strategy with the aim of 
upgrading capital-intensive industries is ineffective and not the best way to develop. 
However, not everyone agree with the theory of comparative advantage, claiming countries 
will have to strategically defy its comparative advantages in order to develop. 
 
There are different ways to interpret what a country should do in order to upgrade its 
industrial structure, and how much it should follow or defy its comparative advantages. Justin 
Lin lays out two opposing development strategies: the comparative-advantage-following 
strategy and the opposing comparative-advantage-defying strategy (Lin 2007: 26-39). While 
Lin is clearly a supporter of a CAF strategy, Ha-Joon Chang is an economist supporting a 
CAD strategy. Obviously, he does not claim that developing countries should follow an all-
out, highly comparative-advantage-defying development strategy like China under Mao or 
the Soviet Union did – but he is nonetheless more supportive of a government that 
strategically defies its natural comparative advantages at a certain point in time. I will use 
these two recognized economists as representatives of the two views, in order to illustrate the 
differences between them. 
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2.3.1 Lin: Development Through a Comparative-Advantage-Following 
Strategy 
For Lin, the starting point in a developmental analysis is a country´s factor endowment 
structure, because it represents the current total budget of the economy. It also illustrates the 
relative prices of different production factors, determining in which industries a country has a 
comparative advantage. In a CAF strategy, the factor endowment structure must be upgraded 
in order to improve the industrial structure of a country. For a developing country, this 
usually means increasing the abundance of capital. This is opposed to a CAD strategy, where 
the government tries to artificially upgrade the industrial structure. According to Lin, firms 
will be most competitive if they enter into industries that are in accordance with the country´s 
factor endowment structure, and thus their comparative advantage, at a given stage of the 
development process (Lin 2007; Lin 2012; Lin 2013A). 
 
A well-functioning market is a necessary condition if a country is to develop in line with its 
comparative advantages. As this is often missing in a developing country, the government has 
to create and promote it instead. With a functioning market, relative prices will reflect 
relative scarcities of the economy´s factors of production, causing enterprises to use efficient 
technologies in efficient industries consistent with their comparative advantages. This will 
create profitable firms and increase the abundance of capital, thus altering the existing factor 
endowment structure and creating comparative advantages in new industries. Existing 
technologies will no longer be optimal and most cost-efficient. This should make enterprises 
implement more capital-intensive technologies in order to stay competitive and adhere to 
their new comparative advantages, causing a technological upgrading. More advanced 
technologies will in turn create bigger profits and increase capital resources, resulting in a 
continuous upgrading of the factor endowment structure (Lin 2007; Lin 2011; Lin 2013B). 
 
While a CAF strategy is centered on businesses moving into those industries where they have 
a comparative advantage at a given point in time, the government does play a role in this 
strategy. It should take on the tasks of information collection and coordination, as well as 
compensating for externalities. It should collect information because it is expensive for 
private companies to do so, but distributing it is cheap. Furthermore, it should coordinate 
private investments and the construction of infrastructure, and other elements vital for 
development. Pioneer companies can provide information through trial and error, and the 
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government should subsidize them due to the costs associated with being the first to enter a 
new industry or utilize more advanced technologies. In order for the state to perform these 
tasks, it will need centralized institutions with the power to organize, coordinate and enforce 
(Lin 2011; Whittaker, Zhu, Sturgeon, Tsai, and Okita 2007). 	  
Infant-industry protection of firms in sectors where the country doesn’t enjoy a comparative 
advantage has no place in a CAF strategy. Because these sectors are not likely to be 
profitable in the short run, the government will eventually have to draw resources from firms 
that operate in industries where they do have a comparative advantage. This will slow down 
the accumulation of capital and the upgrade of the factor endowment structure, haltering the 
development process (Lin and Chang 2009). 
 
2.3.2 Chang: Development Through a Comparative-Advantage-Defying 
Strategy 
As opposed to Lin, Chang believes developing countries have to deliberately and strategically 
violate their comparative advantages, due to the lack of free markets and their use of tariffs 
and quantitative protections (Chang 2006). In order to upgrade its industrial structure, a 
country has to defy rather than follow its comparative advantages. Chang and Lin agree that 
late developers can catch up with earlier developers by importing more advanced 
technologies that they do not possess themselves, and that this is an advantage backwards 
countries can exploit. 
 
Chang favors infant-industry protection and claims it was an important part of the East Asian 
economic success. Because firms in developing countries will have to compete with already 
established companies from developed countries, they cannot survive and has to be protected 
from international competition by the government until they are able to compete. However, in 
order for such a strategy to succeed, the developing country needs to combine it with an 
export-promoting strategy. Exporting goods will accumulate the necessary capital that allows 
infant firms to acquire new and more advanced technologies that they cannot develop 
themselves. This is especially important if a country lacks capabilities in R&D, something 
many developing economies do. At the same time, long-term success in the export of goods 
requires that new industries emerge and that a country´s exports stay competitive. Hence, 
infant-industry promotion and a successful export sector are mutually interdependent (Chang 
2006). 
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One of Chang´s main points is that it is impossible for a developing country to upgrade its 
existing technological structure without defying its comparative advantages and entering an 
industry before the factor endowment structure has been naturally upgraded to an ideal level 
(Lin and Chang 2009). Chang do believe a country can “pick winners”, meaning backing a 
firm in order to make it successful. He uses POSCO, the steel-producing company from his 
native South Korea, to exemplify this. South Korea was a dirt-poor country when it planned 
to build a steel mill in 1965. Succeeding in a capital-intensive industry like steel production 
should not have been possible according to the theory of comparative advantage. 
Additionally, South Korea did not produce the necessary raw materials needed for steel 
manufacturing, and had to import it from far-away countries, something that should have 
made the establishment of a successful steel producing company even harder. POSCO was 
also a state-owned enterprise (SOE), something neo-liberal economist claim to be inefficient, 
led by a former military general. Given these conditions, nobody wanted to invest in the 
company, but South Korea managed to get financial help from Japan. Eventually, POSCO 
became a massive success, and other East Asian countries also managed to successfully pick 
winners (Chang 2010). 
 
Chang does not entirely discard the theory of comparative advantage. Evaluating comparative 
advantages can say something about the sacrifices a country must make when promoting and 
developing infant industries. This information can be used by the developing country to avoid 
excessive infant-industry protection that ends up hurting rather than promoting economic 
growth. One of Chang´s objections to the theory of comparative advantage is that it’s a static 
concept. It can say something about how much a country can gain by specializing in 
industries according to its current factor endowment structure, but not how it can improve its 
situation over time. While it might illustrate what the country is losing by protecting 
industries at a certain point in time, it does not show the future positive or negative outcomes 
of such protection. In his view, one has to ignore comparative advantages initially, causing a 
loss of revenue in the short run, in order to develop new industries that will be profitable 
further down the road. In addition, Chang argues that much technological capacity is 
generated through experiences in new industries, and that in order to improve its technology, 
a developing country will have to enter a new industry before the factor endowment structure 
has been sufficiently upgraded (Chang 2006; Lin and Chang 2009). 
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Later in this thesis, I will use the theoretical framework laid out above to evaluate whether 
China´s attempts at industrial upgrading has resembled a CAF or a CAD strategy the most. 
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3 Export-Processing Zones: Their Purpose and 
Contributions to Economic Growth 
 
 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter presents a background to the first analytical chapter concerning China´s SEZs. 
Understanding EPZs is necessary because they influenced the creation of similar zones in 
China. The chapter starts off by defining EPZs and explaining their purpose. It goes on to 
discuss how such zones can positively or negatively contribute to its host economy, before 
looking at the role of government in EPZs. 
 
3.1 Export-Processing Zones as Instruments for 
Economic Growth 
When China embarked on its Open Door policy in 1979, several Special Economic Zones 
were created in the coastal areas of the country. These were modeled after similar zones 
elsewhere in East Asia, and their purpose was not only to create export-oriented growth, but 
also to function as laboratories for a new economic system. Different types of EPZs have 
been tried out in a number of countries, and been given various titles. Despite different 
names, such zones have many common features. They are industrial enclaves in a country, 
established with the aim of opening the domestic economy up to international markets. There 
is often a desire for a thriving exporting sector, and investments and inflows of foreign 
currency and FDI are important. The host government of such zones provides special 
incentives that are generally not available for companies operating outside them. This 
includes tax breaks, preferable duties on imports, soft regulations on labor and capital, good 
infrastructure, access to resources, and cheap land rent (Amirahmadi and Wu 1995; Ge 
1999). 
 
Defining Export-Processing Zones 
The World Bank has defined EPZs as “fenced-in industrial estates specializing in 
manufacturing for exports that offer firms free trade conditions and a liberal regulatory 
environment” (1992: 7, as cited in Madani 1999: 5). This definition is useful because it 
captures some of the most important elements of EPZs in one sentence. However, not only 
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the desire for an increased export sector has led states to establish such economic enclaves. 
Also a desire for spillover effects to the economy as a whole, as well as an upgrade of 
technology and human capital, has been important reasons behind establishing EPZs. Thus, 
the label “export-processing zone” might be somewhat misleading as other elements than just 
exports have been important in such zones. An EPZ can perhaps be more broadly defined, but 
it is more important that one pays attention to the different aspects of EPZs and the reasons 
why they were created, rather than how they are defined. After something of a modern 
revival in the 1950s, EPZs were only present in a few countries up until the 1970s. Their 
popularity as a policy instrument grew in the following decades, reaching a global total of 
500 in 1996 (Madani 1999: 5). 
 
3.2 The Purpose of Export-Processing Zones 
Export zones are attractive to developing countries. Establishing such zones is a good way to 
attract FDI and they provide an opportunity to enter international markets. They might 
represent the “second best alternative” to reaching such goals, after completely opening up 
the economy as whole (Amirahmadi and Wu 1995: 831-832; Luo 2001: 9). In addition to 
creating inflows of FDI, other reasons for establishing EPZs are increasing revenues of 
foreign exchange, facilitating transfers of technology and know-how, increasing the skills of 
the labor force, promoting non-traditional exports, upgrading the existing industrial system, 
generating employment, and creating backward linkages and spillover effects to the rest of 
the economy (Johansson 1994; Kusago and Tzannatos 1998; Madani 1999). 
 
EPZs can be considered policy tools in a transitional economic phase, as their relative 
importance will decline with the development of the host country and the liberalization of its 
economy and trade system. Establishing EPZs is less risky than entirely opening up the 
economy. With China´s closed economy at the time it launched its economic reforms, it was 
important to maintain control over foreign investments and their influence on the economy. 
This was done through limiting the economic experiments to certain small areas. Although an 
important purpose of EPZs is promoting exports, one should not forget the role played by 
imports. In China, it has been argued that the SEZs actually were more important as import-
processing rather than export-processing zones (Amirahmadi and Wu 1995). 
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Providing Special Incentives 
In order to attract foreign corporations to the EPZs, they have usually been given several 
incentives. This included benefits such as duty-free or favorable duties on necessary imported 
components, tax concessions, cheap rent and land lease, better infrastructure than in the rest 
of the country, and flexible labor regulations. In addition, firms could take advantage of the 
cheap labor offered in the EPZs (Kusago and Tzannatos 1998; Madani 1999; Wong and Chu 
1984). 
 
3.3 EPZ Influence on the Host Economy: Positive or 
Negative? 
Today, many years after the first EPZs were established, there are lots of available data and 
information about the performance of EPZs, and how they might positively or negatively 
influence their host economies. As many export zones no longer play a vital role in their 
economy, the debate on their contributions to the host economy might not be as relevant 
today as it once was. At the same time, developing countries in Africa are experimenting with 
EPZs, drawing on the experiences of China (Lin and Wang 2008: 5). Thus, understanding the 
role such zones have played is important to policy makers in many developing countries of 
today. 
 
Three Views on EPZs 
Traditionally, three main views on EPZs can be identified: studies grounded in neo-classical 
theory tended to conclude that EPZs reduced the welfare of their host countries. The cost-
benefit approach to studying EPZs stated that this critique was unjustified, and that the 
impact of an EPZ on its host country´s welfare could be positive. New growth theory has 
argued that the neo-classical take on EPZs overlooked the importance of spillover effects, 
and failed to take it into account when claiming that EPZs negatively affected their host 
economies (Johansson 1994). 
 
3.3.1 Potential Positive Contributions 
An EPZ can contribute positively to its host economy in a number of ways. It might increase 
the exports of manufactured goods and attract greater inflows of foreign capital and FDI. The 
implementation of foreign technology and managerial skills can upgrade the industrial 
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structure of the host country, and backward linkages might benefit the host economy, 
especially if local content requirements are implemented. It can present valuable experiences 
to policy makers wanting to reform the economic system in a controlled manner. EPZs can 
also act as “windows” to the outside, creating inflows of better technology and knowledge. 
Lack of resources prevents developing countries from investing in many areas 
simultaneously, and focusing those limited resources on EPZs might be a better strategy (Wei 
2000). 
 
The presence of foreign firms in EPZs can upgrade the quality of labor if workers are given 
the opportunity to work with better machinery, more advanced production processes, and 
perform more challenging tasks than they else would have done. However, the tasks 
performed by local labor are often simple and low-tech, requiring limited amounts of skill. 
Thus it is debatable how much the skills of local workers really improve. At the same time, 
local workers might still benefit from learning about production processes, routines, and 
other elements where foreign firms have better practices. If management responsibilities are 
given to local workers, this is also something that can help them acquire new skills. Wages in 
EPZs are usually equal or higher than in the domestic job market outside the zones, and the 
presence of foreign competitors might indirectly increase the quality of the labor force if 
indigenous firms are forced to teach their workers new production methods (Madani 1999). 
 
3.3.2 Potential Negative Contributions 
It is also possible to argument against the use of EPZs. Neo-classically grounded arguments 
against EPZs have been put forth, such as a lower rate of profit in the zones than in protected 
areas, and that EPZs actually discourage FDI inflows (Johansson 1994: 393). It might also be 
questioned whether the effects of backward linkages are very substantial, and if the quality of 
the labor force will increase by much given the fact that most foreign companies are likely to 
move their simple and labor-intensive activities to such zones (Oborne 1986: 79). Foreign 
companies often conduct their advanced operations such as R&D at home and not in the 
developing country, in order to protect their technological advantage (Amirahmadi and Wu 
1995: 845). Despite the positive contribution of higher wages in the zones, there is a 
possibility that foreign corporations attract the best workers from outside the zones, causing a 
brain drain from already less developed areas. When developing an EPZ, the host country has 
to take into account the huge infrastructural costs associated with its establishment, as well as 
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the tax and tariff revenues it will lose out on due to the incentives and economic rebates given 
to foreign firms (Madani 1999). 
 
While it can be argued that a developing country´s limited resources should be aimed at only 
a small number of areas, one might also claim that due to the interconnectedness between a 
country’s industries and regions, it is better to focus efforts at industrialization on several 
areas at once. By attempting to upgrade one area first, economic differences between regions 
are likely to occur (Wei 2000). This has been evident in China where the Eastern part of the 
country is more developed than other regions. Looking at negative consequences behind 
those related to economics, it is a possibility that the low regulations on labor rights in the 
zones might hurt its workers even though their wages might be higher than in alternative 
jobs. Environmental issues might also surface, perhaps not in the immediate future after the 
establishment of the EPZ, but further down the line. 
 
Arguments against EPZs based on neoclassical theories have been put forth. Hence, one 
could assume that the creation of EPZs is contrary to a CAF strategy. However, Lin (2014) 
states that special zones and industrial parks might be used as a tool to reduce transaction 
costs. He claims that most such zones have failed due to high factor costs related to the 
government´s desire to develop industries where it did not have a comparative advantage. 
 
Illustrating Positive and Negative Contributions by EPZs 
Based on the arguments laid out above, arguments for and the corresponding arguments 
against the use of EPZs are summarized in the table below. 
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Table 1: Arguments for and Corresponding Arguments Against the Use of EPZs. 
 
 
 
3.4 The Role of Government in EPZs 
Although the role of government in EPZs might differ from one zone to another, it seems 
plausible that the government of the host country have to undertake at least a minimum of 
actions. When a zone is initially established, it is natural that the government of the host 
country facilitates its creation. It might study the possibilities of establishing a zone and the 
potential consequences of doing so. It will probably also have to set up a legal and 
bureaucratic framework, as well as get the private sector involved (Madani 1999). In order to 
attract foreign enterprises, the government might have to provide economic incentives of the 
kind outlined earlier in this chapter. In the Chinese SEZs, originally located in backward and 
underdeveloped areas, massive infrastructural upgrades were required. As the EPZs are not 
likely to be profitable right from the start, the government might also need to cover 
substantial parts of the early costs of running the EPZ. Some revenues and costs associated 
with EPZs are illustrated below. 
Arguments for the Use of EPZs: Arguments Against the Use of EPZs: 
Greater inflows of FDI and foreign currency Neo-classical argument that EPZs actually decrease FDI 
Transfer of foreign technology Most R&D undertaken in the corporation´s home country; not 
necessarily great technology transfers 
Increase managerial skills Such increased skills might not be put to use outside the EPZs 
Backward linkages and spillover effects to 
the host economy as a whole 
Neo-classical argument that spillover effects are overestimated. 
Economic activity mainly confined to the EPZs 
Allow the host country to conduct 
controlled economic experiments 
Activities in EPZs are often very different from the rest of the 
country, might not be very valuable 
Increased wages and higher living standards Low labor regulations, workers might not be allowed to organize 
Increased employment opportunities Drawing workers from outside the zones, creating a brain-drain 
from already backward areas 
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Table 2: Government Revenues and Costs Associated With EPZs. 
 
Source: Akinci and Crittle 2008: 33. 
Government Revenues From EPZs: Government Costs of EPZs: 
Potential revenue from corporate tax Loss of revenue due to economic incentives 
Revenue from exports Cost of imports 
Increased inflows of FDI Costs of building infrastructure 
Permit fees and charges in the EPZ Increased costs of administration 
Import duties Subsidies 
  Sale of land Environmental costs !
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4 Developments in the Chinese Economy Under 
Mao 
 
 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter is about the state of the Chinese economy under Mao Zedong, the leader of 
China prior to Deng Xiaoping. It evaluates the choice of development strategy, and the main 
reasons why it failed to achieve economic growth. It is important to recognize the 
developments under Mao if one wants to understand the economic reforms launched by 
Deng, and why they were so groundbreaking. 
 
4.1 The Choice of Development Strategy 
When the People´s Republic of China was established under the leadership of Mao Zedong in 
1949, it was a backwards, agrarian country. China lacked capital and faced isolation from the 
international community. The regime chose to follow a “big push” industrialization strategy 
centralized around a planned economy and the development of heavy industries. The vast 
majority of investments in China at the time came from the government, with the aim of 
rapidly industrializing the country (Headey, Kanbur, and Zhang 2008; Lin et al. 2003; Lin 
2012; Naughton 2007). The choice of development strategy was not unique. Many countries 
have tried to achieve economic growth through import-substitution industrialization and 
heavy-industrial development after World War II. The desire for a powerful military and 
national defense did likely affect China´s choice of development strategy. Essentially, 
without a strong military able to defend the country, China was not secure. Mao´s China 
faced a potential conflict with Taiwan and had to consider what was going on at the Korean 
peninsula. Western capitalist countries isolated China economically and imposed sanctions 
on trade so it had to develop its own comprehensive industrial structure in a short period of 
time (Lin et al. 2003; Lin 2007).  
 
4.1.1 The Soviet Union as a Role Model and a Focus on Heavy Industry 
The Soviet Union acted as a role model for China. The two countries shared similar initial 
conditions at the start of their development, both being backwards, communist, and agrarian 
economies. U.S. and Western hostilities towards China also made it turn to Soviet for aid in 
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reconstructing the country. The Soviet Union did enjoy some initial success in the 
development of its heavy industries (Howell 1993: 46; Lin 2012: 70). Chinese leaders did not 
believe the internal market was big enough to profitably and fruitfully develop light 
industries, and that the development of heavy industries could help China overcome the 
issues of limited demand and a lack of capital. The idea was to skip the stage of developing 
light industries and go straight to the development of heavy industries. Mao wanted to rebuild 
the Chinese economy from scratch while focusing on central planning and control, state 
ownership, political loyalty, and agricultural collectivization, while eliminating the private 
sector (Lin et al. 2003; McKenney 1993). 
 
Mao himself stated: “without heavy industry there can be no solid national defense, no well-
being for the people, no prosperity and strength for the nation” (Zedong 1945, as cited in Lin 
2007: 18). Hence, one important reason for developing heavy industries was likely to build 
up defensive capabilities. China wanted to achieve maximum growth in its industrial and 
military capacity as fast as possible (Naughton 1995)4. 
 
To a big extent, China lacked the essentials for a successful development of heavy industries 
at the time, such as capital and foreign exchange, an economic surplus, and the capacity to 
export (Naughton 1995). As the market could not facilitate its development, the state had to 
do it instead. Interest and exchange rates were high, making the development of capital-
intensive industries expensive, while the cost of labor was low. China´s development strategy 
in the 1950s has been labeled a “leap-forward strategy” due to the large gap between the 
developmental goals and the reality of China´s situation at the time (Lin et al. 2003: 39-40). 
China under Mao sought to develop while ignoring its comparative advantage in labor-
intensive industries. The economic growth was less than what it could have been, and SOEs 
were highly inefficient with workers lacking the incentives to perform (Bjerkholt 2012; 
Headey et al. 2008; Lin et al. 2003). 
 
With a huge agricultural sector and a scarcity of capital, why did Chinese leaders choose the 
heavy-industrial developmental path? Mao stated in 1944 that the country´s backwardness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Mao was not the first Chinese statesman to consider this strategy. Sun Yat-sen, “the father of modern China”, 
focused on the development of basic, key industries in his plan for Chinese industrialization in 1919 (Lin 2007: 
19). 	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was due to the lack of modern industries, and that the Chinese people would not support the 
party if it did not manage to build up its industries, enhance productivity, and solve economic 
issues. The new Chinese republic´s 1st Five-Year Plan (FYP) in 1953 clearly laid out the goal 
of developing heavy industries as the core of industrialization, and this was supposed to be 
the backbone of the socialist industrialization. Hairy goals were set, and China was to exceed 
the industrial power of Great Britain within ten years and catch up with the U.S. within 15 
(Lin 2007: 20-21). It is hard to categorize the Mao-era as something distinct, because the 
policies were altered many times. In some periods, it was a uniquely “Chinese” or “Maoist” 
model, other times it resembled the Soviet system to a bigger extent. Mao changed the course 
of the economy several times, according to his personal ideas and beliefs, or based on who 
his personal enemies were (Naughton 2007). 
 
4.1.2 The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution 
China paid dearly for some of the catastrophic economic policies under Mao. In 1958, Mao 
launched the disastrous Great Leap Forward, with the aim of reaching unrealistic levels of 
industrialization and agricultural development (McKenney 1993: 3). Despite a great autumn 
harvest in 1958 and a rapid increase in steel production, the Great Leap turned out to be 
anything but great. The leadership made two devastating decisions: they reduced the supply 
of resources needed for production in the agricultural sector, and increased the government´s 
share of procured grain. The pursuit of industrialization continued with output targets raised 
again and again, and resources and manpower were drawn away from agricultural 
production. In the 1960s, China experienced a serious shortage of food, and a full-blown 
famine soon ensued, mainly in the rural areas of China. The state continued to extract food 
from the countryside and provide it to urban areas, in order to keep up the appearance of 
normality. Some authors claim this three-year famine caused the death of 30 million people, 
but it is impossible to know exactly how many Chinese lost their lives during this experiment 
(Lin et al. 2003: 57-58; Lin 2012: 88). In the end, the Great Leap Forward caused a one-third 
decline in China´s GDP, and much industry was seriously distorted. In 1961, the experiment 
ended, and the worst part of the famine was over in 1962 (Naughton 2007; McKenney 1993). 
 
In the aftermath of the failed Great Leap Forward, a series of reforms were implemented in 
order to restore the economy over the next five-year period. Deng played a role in the 
economic restructuring, and improvements were made on both social and economic matters. 
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Mao launched another ambitious project in 1966, which also turned out to be catastrophic: 
the goal of the Cultural Revolution was to transfer power to the people from the cultural and 
political elites, and the Red Guards, composed of students, were encouraged to overthrow the 
leaders of the CCP (but not Mao himself, obviously). Deng was among those criticized and 
stripped of his power. It created an isolationist economy where both imports and exports were 
outlawed. Foreign trade continued, but on a much smaller scale. Despite this, the economic 
consequences of the Cultural Revolution were actually not as big as one could assume. 
Agricultural production and industrial output were less distorted than during the Great Leap 
Forward (Howell 1993; McKenney 1993; Naughton 2007). 
 
4.1.3 Achieving Growth Despite a Failed Development Strategy 
Despite promoting industries where it lacked the fundamentals for success, China´s economy 
did grow quite substantially from 1952 to 1978. Its GDP grew at 6 % per year, more than the 
world average and almost as much as South Korea and Taiwan. Industrial output grew at 11.5 
% annually in the same period (Bjerkholt 2012: 49; Lin et al. 2003: 70; Naughton 2007). As I 
have pointed out earlier in this thesis, one should not readily accept official Chinese statistics. 
Even if the 6 % annual GDP growth was real, this is not unnatural considering the enormous 
investments undertaken by the government. This jump-started the economy after a period of 
stagnation, but it is hard to assess how much it actually positively contributed to the 
economy, because much of the economy was highly inefficient. Heavy industries increase 
demand from other heavy-industrial sectors and developing such industries can create 
economic activity, but it does not create many spillovers. China´s starting point with a very 
small economy made relative levels of high growth easier than for countries with bigger 
economies, and much of the economic growth came from investments in heavy industries 
(Lin et al. 2003, Naughton 2007). This points to the importance of a qualitative research 
approach when studying phenomena like economic growth processes, because the reality is 
not necessarily as straightforward as it initially might seem. 
 
As China followed a heavy-industrial-developing strategy, it was natural that some industries 
grew at a much higher rate than others. Those sectors promoted by the state reached higher 
levels of growth, while the agricultural and tertiary sectors grew slower, creating uneven and 
not substantive economic growth. In addition, this growth did not lead to a big improvement 
in the living standards of the Chinese. Although the inefficiencies of the Chinese economic 
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system were recognized in the 1960s (Lin et al. 2003), it was not until Deng came to power 
and launched economic reforms in 1978 that things really started to change5. 
 
4.1.4 The Death of Mao and the Emergence of Deng 
Deng was eventually brought back to the national leadership, but things once again got 
chaotic when the Gang of Four came onto the scene in 1974. After a campaign against Deng 
two years later, he was again thrown out of his position of power (Howell 1993: 47). When 
Mao died in 1976, the ten years of chaos created by the Cultural Revolution finally ended, 
having pushed the economy to the brink of collapse (Howell 1993: 64; Lin et al. 2003: 139). 
While the economy at the time was in a sorrow state, it still had potential for growth. The 
initial response in the aftermath of Mao was to rebuild the old economic system, and the 
Chinese economy actually moved towards that of the Soviet Union in 1977 and 1978 (Howell 
1993: 48; Naughton 1995: 64-65). The rebuilding of the former planned economic system 
was combined with a desire for economic growth, something that was unrealistic. Re-
establishing the former system turned out to be more difficult than some had anticipated, and 
the ambitious Ten Year Plan established in 1978 collapsed the same year. Thus, it seems like 
China´s leaders had not learnt much from their previous experiences with a planned 
economic system. The influence of those wanting reform, among them Deng, were growing, 
and eventually led to the consolidation of Deng as China´s new leader (Howell 1993; 
Naughton 1995). 	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 It has been argued that Deng was not always a proponent of marked-oriented economic reforms, just waiting 
for the chance to turn China capitalist, as he is sometimes portrayed (Naughton 1995: 62). 
	   42	  
5 The Chinese Economy Under Deng 
 
 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter evaluates the developments in China´s economy after Deng Xiaoping came to 
power. He became the leader of China a few years following the death of Mao and 
implemented drastic reforms. The results have been highly successful. The chapter starts off 
considering the first reforms launched by Deng. It explores how the Chinese economy took 
off through an export-led growth strategy, and the reasons why the reforms were carried out. 
After this, it is attempted to illustrate the changes in the Chinese economy through the use of 
some main economic indicators. 
 
5.1 Deng´s Initial Economic Reforms 
While China´s economic performance over the last decades has been spectacular, problems 
related to both its economy and other areas of society persist. However, one has to keep its 
starting point in mind, and acknowledge just how far it has come in less than forty years. 
When Deng came to power, China´s economic conditions were unfavorable after years of 
failed policies. At the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee Congress in December 
1978, Deng became the leader of China. This was perhaps the single most important 
happening in the transition to a new economic system (Naughton 2007). 
 
Deng thought that mastering science, technology and management were necessary if China 
was to prosper (Zweig 2002: 28-29). This was in line with the aim of shifting China´s focus 
from the existing communist themes of the time to a modernization of agriculture, industry, 
science, and technology. The so-called “Four Modernizations”6 were meant to turn China 
into a relatively advanced society by the turn of the millennium (McKenney 1993: 6). Under 
Deng´s leadership, China moved its focus from heavy to light industries and agriculture. 
China needed to create more jobs, something it could do by focusing more on industries with 
bigger needs for manual labor (Naughton 1995). In general, Deng´s return to the political 
scene marked a change towards a more innovative and exploratory economy, contrasting the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The “Four Modernizations” was a term first put forth by Zhou Enlai, and Deng later adopted it (Gross 1988: 
24; Oborne 1986: 11). 
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policies of Mao (Howell 1993). Despite the years of catastrophic economic policies under 
Mao, China did have a large potential for growth, and some of this potential was released 
during the first years of Deng´s leadership (Howell 1993; Naughton 1995). As such, a lot of 
what China needed at the time was probably a pragmatist like Deng, someone who 
acknowledged China´s unique economic features and was able to do what was necessary to 
realize its economic potential. His pragmatic take on development is evident in perhaps his 
most famous quote: “it doesn´t matter if a cat is black or white, as long as it can catch mice, 
it’s a good cat”. As is discussed in depth later in this thesis, China also launched the SEZs 
under Deng, an important part of the process of opening up the economy. This led to greater 
contact with the international markets and introduced capitalism to China. The first reforms 
were launched in those areas were it was possible to achieve fast gains that benefited the 
population, and the reform policy gained support from many different groups of society 
(Knoth 2000). 
 
5.1.1 Early Reforms in the Agricultural and Industrial Sectors 
Right from the start of Deng´s leadership, efforts aimed at reforming the industrial sector 
were undertaken. The autonomy of enterprises was increased, and the market was allowed to 
play a bigger role. In 1979 it was decided that some enterprises were to be given the 
possibility of retaining parts of their profits, and the following year it was announced that this 
was to be expanded to every state industrial firm in China. A price reform was also launched, 
and the market was allowed to determine prices to a bigger extent, and helped correct price 
distortions (Luo 2001; Naughton 1995; Riskin 1987). It is probably hard to overestimate the 
magnitude of such policies in a country ruled by a party with communism as its official 
ideology. Generally, it seems like China under Deng was less concerned with ideology and 
focused more on flexibility. 	  
The existing system was resistant to change. The reforms aimed at financial rationalization 
did not succeed, and many of the initial attempts at reform failed, although the economy had 
been somewhat decentralized and liberalized. The Chinese non-state sector experienced 
growth under Deng, and many new private companies were established. This increased the 
number of products available on the market and created competition for SOEs, something 
that was probably a good thing given that these were inefficient and needed to adjust to the 
new economic reality. With the decollectivization of agriculture, rural enterprises finally had 
a chance to establish themselves, and the number of rural firms and township and village 
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enterprises (TVEs) grew (Naughton 1995: 137). In order to increase agricultural productivity, 
the Household Responsibility System (HRS) was implemented in 1979 and completed in 
1983 (Lin 1992: 34-36). Farmers were allowed to work on a collectively owned piece of land 
under the new system. After a certain production quota had been filled, they could keep the 
rest of what they produced (Alder, Shao, and Zilibotti 2012: 8-9). All in all, the HRS was a 
huge success, increasing agricultural production between 1979 and 1984, as well as 
improving the living standard in rural China (Varum, Huang, and Gouveia 2007: 12). 
 
5.1.2 Export-led Economic Growth and Foreign Trade Reforms 
Under the leadership of Deng, the Chinese government realized it had to orient its economy 
outwards. The Open Door policy was to incorporate the Chinese economy with the world 
markets, and reform the inefficient economic system from the Mao-era. A policy aimed at 
expanding foreign trade was adopted in 1979 by the People´s Congress (Chow 2007). 
However, it is important to note that the Open Door policy was not synonymous with trade 
liberalization. The former sought to attract foreign technology and capital in order to build up 
the national economy without having to rely on other countries, while the latter is about 
laying the foundation for free trade through tearing down tariff and trade barriers (Tzeng 
1991). The government sought to upgrade China´s industrial structure from labor-intensive to 
capital-intensive manufacturing with the assistance of foreign technology and investments. 
Revenues from exports of agricultural products and raw materials could be used to finance 
imports needed in order to develop other exporting industries. The coastal areas were 
supposed to be the frontrunners in the export-led growth, where firms would use the earnings 
created by exports to upgrade their technology (McKenney 1993; Tzeng 1991; Wedeman 
2003).  
 
Vital raw materials were directed from the producers in inner China to the exporters on the 
coast, meaning regional barriers also had to be torn down in order to make the economy more 
efficient and create successful exporting firms (Wedeman 2003). The labor-intensive 
industries were to move westward, with the non-exporting regions gradually taking over the 
responsibility of producing goods for the domestic market. This would enable China to 
achieve industrial upgrading while at the same time continue to take advantage of its cheap 
labor (Chow 2007). The activities of exporting firms on the coast were also supposed to 
create positive spillover effects, because the increased need for raw materials would benefit 
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the interior regions. Although much credit has been given to the export-oriented development 
strategy in both China and in East Asia in general, one should not downplay the role played 
by import substitution. In order to reduce tensions between the Eastern and Western parts of 
China, as well as decrease competition for the same resources, the Coastal Development 
Strategy (CDS) was launched in 1988, where exporting firms would start importing raw 
materials from abroad (Tzeng 2001; Wedeman 2003: 35-37). Under the CDS, export-
processing activities on the coast were meant to obtain foreign capital and better technology 
while expanding the Chinese economy. The interior regions would follow an import-
industrialization strategy and produce what the domestic marked needed. This would 
minimize the need for exports and increase China´s trade balance (Tzeng 2001; Wedeman 
2003). 
 
5.2 Developments in China´s GDP and GDP Per Capita 
There is no denying the fantastic rates of economic growth China has experienced after Deng 
came to power and opened up the economy in the late 1970s. Perhaps the most fundamental 
indicator of the size and strength of a country´s economy, GDP, have been steadily rising in 
China. Obviously, one should be careful when using data and statistics from any source, and 
perhaps even more so when the source is a government that might have incentives to 
manipulate statistics. The reliability of official Chinese statistics has been discussed in-depth 
in chapter 1. 
 
Figure 1: Growth in GDP and GDP Per Capita, Annual %. 1978-2012. 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2014. 
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As shown in figure 1, the annual growth in China´s GDP and GDP per capita were rapid after 
the first economic reforms were implemented. However, the growth rates decreased at the 
turn of the 1980s, due to Deng´s desire for price reforms and internal divisions in the CCP 
(Vogel 2013: 469-473). After declining in 1989 and 1990, the high growth was resumed in 
1991. The Chinese economy didn’t entirely escape the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, 
experiencing a small dip in its growth. However, when looking at the actual annual growth of 
GDP and GDP per capita, it is evident that the economy was still growing at a high rate. In 
the mid-2000s, GDP and GDP per capita grew in double digits, reaching 14.2 % and 13.6 % 
respectively in 2007. It dipped somewhat after this, but still grew at 7.8 % and 7.3 % in 2012 
(World Bank 2014). 
The Chinese GDP grew at an average of almost 10 % annually from 1978-2012, while GDP 
per capita grew at almost 9 % annually in the same period (World Bank 2014). These rates of 
economic growth are something few, if any countries have been experiencing in the past, or 
are likely to be experiencing in the future. 
As shown in figure 2 below, the size of China´s GDP when Deng came to power was USD 
148.2 billion. By 2012, it had risen to a whopping USD 8,227.1 trillion. GDP per capita was a 
meager USD 155 in 1978; in 2012 it was USD 6,091 (World Bank 2014). 
 
Figure 2: Growth in GDP, Current USD Billion and GDP Per Capita, Current USD. 1978-2012. 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2014. 
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5.3 Foreign Trade Performance 
China has managed to increase its exports very much during the course of its economic 
transformation. From 1980-1991, its foreign trade grew at 9.2 % or 12.3 % per year7, 
compared to a world average of 5.5 % per annum (Lardy 1992: 695). In the last decade 
before the turn of the millennium, manufactured exports grew at 16.9 % per year, compared 
to a world average of 6.4 % (Lall and Albaladejo 2004: 1444). China´s total value of imports 
and exports grew from USD 20.64 billion in 1978 to USD 2.97 trillion in 2010 (China 
Statistical Yearbook 2011: 220, table 6-3). 
 
Like China´s GDP and GDP per capita, the import and export of goods and services as a 
percentage of GDP has risen drastically in the period 1978-2012. From a starting point of 7.1 
% for imports and 6.6 % for exports, they rose to 24.5 % and 27.3 % respectively in 2012 
(World Bank 2014). It is natural that the graph has declined somewhat in the last few years, 
due to the Asian financial crisis and a generally slower Chinese economic growth. 
 
Figure 3: Growth in Imports and Exports of Goods and Services as % of GDP. 1978-2012. 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2014. 
Increasing exports was one of the fundamental reasons why the SEZs were created. China 
initially focused on exporting simple goods, but has focused on upgrading its industrial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The growth rate is calculated differently by the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Trade and the General 
Customs Administration. 
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structure and export more advanced products as its economy has developed. Primary and 
manufactured goods represented 25.6 % and 74.4 % of total exports in 1990; in 2010 these 
represented 5.2 % and 94.8 % respectively. Imports of primary and manufactured goods 
represented 18.5 % and 81.5 % each in 1990, and in 2010 had shifted to 31.1 % and 68.9 % 
(China Statistical Yearbook 2011: 12, table 1-3). 
These numbers illustrate that China has increased its amount of exported manufactured 
goods, and today such goods make up almost all of its exports. Similarly, the import of 
manufactured goods has declined, while imports of primary goods have risen. China is now 
exporting more advanced products, and importing less advanced products than in did before, 
pointing to an upgrade of its import and export structures. 
Sun and Parikh (2001) find that export expansion generally has been beneficial to China´s 
economic growth. They also find positive spillover effects from the export to non-exporting 
sector. Unsurprisingly, they find that the positive impact of exports on GDP growth was 
significantly different from one region to another, with exports being more positive to GDP 
growth at the Eastern coast than in the central and Western parts of the country. Thus how 
much exports and FDI inflows can positively affect economic growth is highly dependent on 
the level of development, industrial structure, degree of openness, and policies of a region. 
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6 China´s SEZs: Why They Were Created, 
Their Positive Contributions, and Policies 
Towards Them 
 
 
Chapter Outline 
This chapter is the first of the two analytical chapters of this thesis. A set of thesis questions 
was outlined in chapter 1. This chapter seeks to answer the following questions:  
 
o What were the government´s policies towards the SEZs? 
o Why were the SEZs established and how did they contribute to China´s economic 
growth and the development of its economic system? 
 
The chapter starts off with a presentation of China´s type of EPZ, the Special Economic 
Zones. Their historical background, how they were created, and some of their main 
developments are outlined. It goes on to analyze the government’s policies towards the SEZs, 
the reasons for establishing them, and how they contributed to the economic growth and the 
developments in China´s economic system. The case of the Shenzhen SEZ is explored in 
greater detail, before it is shortly discussed what China´s development could have looked like 
if the SEZs were never established. 
 
6.1 EPZs in China: the Special Economic Zones 
China´s type of export-processing zones, the SEZs, have been claimed to be the most 
comprehensive of the various export-processing zones as far as the scope of economic 
activities are concerned. The SEZs symbolized something entirely new and in many ways 
represented much of the pragmatism evident in Deng´s China, with a focus on achieving 
economic growth rater than socializing the economy (Ge 1999: 1268; Stoltenberg 1984: 637). 
 
6.1.1 Historical Background and Development of the SEZs 
When Deng came to power, China had experienced years of economic failures. The 
collectivization of agriculture, the ambitious attempt at industrializing China, the Great Leap 
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Forward, and the Cultural Revolution were all epic failures. The heavy-industry-oriented 
development strategy had increased the gap in the level of industrialization between China 
and other countries. Starvation had caused millions of deaths, the economy was almost 
destroyed, the living standard certainly wasn’t rising, and people questioned the 
government’s ability to lead. Deng realized that the market had to be allowed to play a part in 
the economy. At the same time, entirely opening up the closed, socialist economy of a 
massive country like China would have been difficult and potentially destabilizing. 
Reforming the economy more gradually and at a slower pace was more desirable, and in 
hindsight it was probably a better solution (Ge 1999; Lin et al. 2003; McKenney 1993). 
 
The idea of setting up SEZs was discussed for the first time when Deng was briefed on a 
local problem in Guangdong: young men were fleeing Southern China trying to get to Hong 
Kong, and many died in the process. The initial response to the problem had been to set up 
fences and patrol the mainland border, but when Deng learned about the situation, he stated 
that the problem could not be solved with such measures. He said the reason for the escape 
attempts was the widening gap in living standards between China and Hong Kong, and in 
order to keep people from fleeing the mainland, China´s standard of living had to be 
improved. While visiting Guangdong, Deng also heard local officials complain about the lack 
of foreign currency, something that was needed in order to pay for foreign technology. 
Setting up two agricultural collection zones that could export fruits and vegetables to Hong 
Kong was discussed. In early 1979, shortly after Deng officially came to power, the process 
of getting Beijing to allow Guangdong to accept foreign investments begun. The idea was to 
create the foundation for the manufacturing of exports, initially in Guangdong, with Fujian 
province eventually following suit (Vogel 2013). 
 
The First Foreign Investment to China 
Only a few weeks later, the first foreign investment was approved. The investing company 
was a Hong Kong-based firm wanting to destroy old ships in order to use the scrap metal in 
construction projects. The experience with economic liberalization began in Shekou, located 
in southwestern Shenzhen (Vogel 2013: 397). It was actually this Hong Kong firm that 
originally launched the idea of developing Shekou into an industrial zone, and it requested 
special incentives from the central government. Shekou was an industrial zone comparable to 
the Asian EPZs, and while it was the first area allowing the presence of foreign capital and 
investors, it was not a SEZ as such (Yee 1992).  
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The two first economic zones were established in July 1979 in the provinces of Fujian and 
Guangdong. These provinces were allowed to experiment with more market-driven and 
outward-oriented economic systems while receiving government support. The first four 
official SEZs were set up the year after. These were Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, and Xiamen 
(Howell 1993; Vogel 2013; Yee 1992). 
 
Figure 4: Map of the First Four SEZs in China. 
 
 
Source: Understand-china.com 2010. 
 
6.1.2 Further Expanding the SEZs and Introducing New Types of Zones 
The SEZs played a crucial role in China´s strategy of opening up its economy to the world. It 
has been argued that the Chinese SEZs were influenced by the success of similar zones in 
Taiwan and South Korea, as well as zones in other Asian countries (Falkenheim 1985: 145; 
Wei 2000: 199). Although both EPZs and SEZs are free trade zones, there are some 
differences between them. SEZs were generally more comprehensive in both size and scope, 
engaged in a wider range of activities. However, both types of zones performed many of the 
same roles, such as experimenting with newer and more advanced technology, creating 
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employment, and earning foreign exchange (Ota 2003). The East Asian EPZs were tools in 
an export-oriented industrialization strategy, after import-substitution industrialization was 
pursued, with a bigger focus on increasing exports. The Chinese SEZs to some extent 
pursued both of these objectives at the same time, and had a more general desire for the 
development of the economy and the economic system (Knoth 2000; Ota 2003). 
 
Despite good economic growth in the first years of the SEZs, not everyone was happy with 
their performance. Some were not satisfied with their ability to attract foreign technology and 
earn foreign exchange. Most of Shenzhen´s FDI at the time came from Hong Kong, 
illustrating the cautious behavior of investors from the West and the more developed Asian 
countries. Economic crimes and inflation, massive infrastructural investments and fiscal 
deficits represented restraints on the success of the SEZs. However, the central leadership 
must have recognized the achievements and future potential of the zones, as the SEZ policy 
was further expanded with the opening of fourteen coastal cities with similar policies in 1984 
(McKenney 1993; Ota 2003). 
 
Some also complained about the big proportion of labor-intensive production going on the 
SEZs, instead of the high-tech manufacturing activities they were supposed to be creating. In 
order to emphasize the governments desire for technological upgrading in the new areas, new 
zones called “Economic and Technological Development Zones” were created. Other 
economic zones with similar purposes, but different names, were also established (Vogel 
2013; Zeng 2010). With the increasing number of different economic zones in China, the 
initial SEZs gradually lost some of their unique status. After Deng´s “Southern tour” of 1992, 
he urged local governments to continue the reform process, something that increased FDI 
inflows even more. New sectors were opened up to foreign investments. This did not reduce 
differences between Chinese regions, which continued to worsen (Abraham, Konings, and 
Slootmaekers 2010; Ota 2003). The 9th FYP (1996-2000) sought to reduce regional 
differences, with measures such as the “Great Western Development Act” (Guangwen 2003: 
64). Tax incentives previously given to foreign businesses in the SEZs were restricted, while 
the SEZ policy were expanded to interior regions. Despite a decline in the relative importance 
of the original four zones, FDI inflows to them reached an all-time high in 2007 (Naughton 
2007; Ota 2003; Zeng 2011). 
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6.2 Government Policies Towards the SEZs 
The pragmatic and flexible nature of the Chinese leadership during the initial economic 
reforms, and the willingness to break with the past and experiment with an entirely new 
economic system, enabled China to slowly implement capitalism after decades with a 
planned economy. While it might be difficult to point to an overall policy towards the SEZs, 
some elements making up a larger strategy can be distinguished. The pragmatism evident in 
the Deng-era in general stands out also when considering the policies towards the SEZs. The 
Open Door policy and the way the SEZs were created did not seem to have the ideological 
underpinnings it easily could have had, and the slogan “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” showed that socialism in China was not untouchable (Lim 2014). It 
symbolizes how China welcomed capitalism while at the same time not departing too far 
away from its official ideology. 
 
In my opinion, the most impressing aspect of the policy towards the SEZs was how the 
Chinese leadership managed to use the zones as tools to rapidly develop some parts of China 
and its economy, while at the same time maintaining control of the CCP (where internal 
intrigues has not been uncommon in the past) and retain its legitimacy towards the vast 
population it controlled. Additionally, the Deng administration managed to successfully do so 
while most of the time being in line with party ideology and tackling the various issues it 
faced over the years. Knoth (2000: 14) lists two challenges leaders of transition economies 
face: opposition from inside the political system, and opposition from people that are not 
happy with the outcome of reforms. China under Deng faced and tackled both these 
challenges when implementing the economic reforms. 
 
Obviously, the CCP has done horrible things to maintain power, not only under Deng, but 
after his time as well. I am very aware of this. However, a debate around the rights and 
wrongs of the CCP is outside the scope of this thesis. Regardless of what the CCP has done in 
the past, from a political science perspective, the way it implemented its reforms while 
remaining in control of China is remarkable. Other non-democratic states have failed to 
achieve such accomplishments, despite having the same tools available. 
 
Of the more specific policies towards the SEZs, the degree of autonomy given to them and 
their possibility of experimenting with different policies was crucial. Too much central 
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control could have stalled their development. The strategy of developing the coastal areas of 
China was the right one, as these areas had more experience with light manufacturing, were 
more advanced, had favorable locations close to more developed areas, and the possibility to 
produce and export goods in accordance with China´s natural endowment structure. 
Developing a legal framework and simplifying bureaucratic procedures helped earn the trust 
of foreign investors, and the economic incentives given to them could also have been an 
element that attracted them to China. Using the potential of the huge Chinese market to 
bargain for foreign technology, and allowing joint ventures (JVs) to be set up, were smart 
ways to get access to more advanced technology from the outside. Gradually opening China 
up to capitalism and conducting economic experiments in some areas initially let the CCP 
stay in control while flirting with a totally different economic system. The reasons why the 
Chinese government established the SEZs and the main policies towards them are further 
outlined in the next section. 
 
6.2.1 Creating a Legal Framework for the SEZs 
The CCP initially issued a directive in July 1979, allowing Guangdong and Fujian to adopt 
special and flexible policies in order to develop foreign trade, tourism, and attract 
investments (Fenwick 1984: 397). The Regulations on Special Economic Zones in 
Guangdong Province (hereafter the Regulations), approved by the People´s Congress in 
August 1980, established the first legal framework regarding the SEZs (Xu 2011: 1115). The 
Xiamen SEZ in Fujian province was set up a few months after the zones in Guangdong. 
Article 1 of the Regulations state:  
 
“In order to develop economic co-operation and technical exchanges with foreign countries 
and to promote the socialist modernization programme, certain areas are to be delineated in 
the three cities of Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province for the 
establishment of special economic zones” (Novexcn.com n.d.). 
 
The way the SEZs were administrated was new to China, with its traditionally strong and 
centralized government. They were given much autonomy and freedom in how they operated, 
and administrative decentralization was encouraged for the first time. The SEZs were from 
the beginning set up as independent administrative units and governed by the province rather 
than the central government. Article 3 of the Regulations states:  
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“A Guangdong Province Committee for Administering Special Economic Zones shall be set 
up to exercise unified administration of the special zones on behalf of the People's 
Government of Guangdong Province” (Novexcn.com n.d.).  
 
This article brought the SEZs under the direct control of local provincial committees, giving 
them a significant amount of power in the way they were administered and how they 
developed (Tantri 2013). Various regulatory bodies were created, for example the 
Guangdong Provincial Administrative Committee for the Special Economic Zones 
established by the provincial government. Its role was to coordinate and oversee 
development, and it was granted extensive administrative powers (Yee 1992: 66). Each SEZ 
was governed in a somewhat different manner, but administered by a committee of the 
Municipal People´s Government of the zone. Also Fujian set up an administrative committee 
for the regulation of its Xiamen SEZ. The SEZs were granted independent legislative rights, 
allowing them to reduce bureaucratic procedures and increase efficiency. The Chinese SEZs 
were administrated at a much lower level than EPZs found in other countries, which where 
normally controlled by the central government (Fan 1998; Gross 1988; Knoth 2000). Also the 
wide scope of functions allowed in the SEZs differed from the main purposes of the EPZs. 
Article 4 of the Regulations illustrates this: 
 
“Investors may establish with their own investment, or in joint ventures with our side, all 
projects that have positive significance for international economic co-operation and 
technical exchanges, including those relating to industry, agriculture, animal husbandry, 
aquaculture, tourism, housing and construction, and research and manufacture involving 
advanced technology, as well as other businesses of common interest to investors and to our 
side” (Novexcn.com n.d.). 
 
6.2.2 Beijing: Delegating Authority, but Always Maintaining Control 
While the pragmatic leadership of Deng gave the SEZs a considerable amount of 
administrative autonomy, Beijing made sure they could control the zones. In order for the 
CCP to legitimize the establishment of the SEZs and the non-socialist values they 
represented, it was important that the policies towards them were based on an underlying 
socialist political authority and national sovereignty. The history of foreign enclaves in China 
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prior to 1949 is something linked to national humiliation, and that is why the Chinese 
government clearly stated the difference between the SEZs and earlier foreign-dominated 
enclaves. Thus, Beijing had more control over the SEZs than what it might seem like at first 
sight (Fenwick 1984; Gross 1988; Zheng 1987). For example did the central government 
retain ownership of SEZ land; this was covered in article 12 of the Regulations: 
 
“Land in the special zones is owned by the People's Republic of China. The land to be used 
by investors will be provided according to actual needs; the duration of its use, the amount of 
the use fee and the method of payment will be given preferential consideration according to 
the different types of business and uses, and specific measures will be separately provided” 
(Novexcn.com n.d.). 
 
The Regulations were quite vague on matters important to foreign investors, something that 
might have been intentional in order to give the Chinese government flexibility and 
maximum control over the zones (Fenwick 1984). 
 
6.2.3 Improving Infrastructure and the Regulatory Framework 
Despite article 5 giving the Guangdong Province Committee the responsibility for 
“undertaking land-leveling projects and building various public utilities in the special zones” 
(Novexcn.com n.d.), the underdeveloped infrastructure represented a problem in the initial 
stages of the SEZs, as did their uncertain regulatory framework and the low quality of their 
labor force. However, measures by the government were taken to improve the conditions in 
the zones. A regulatory framework was adopted to protect the interests of foreign investors, 
with laws regulating the activity in the SEZs later being written into national law after first 
being tried out in the zones. The Chinese government understood that in order to secure FDI 
inflows, which were one of the underlying reasons behind the establishment of the zones, 
special legislation guaranteeing the security and confidence of foreign investors in the zones 
was necessary. This is one of the reasons why the SEZs were given vast autonomy and why 
they developed a much more encompassing legal framework compared to that in China in 
general (Fenwick 1984; Stoltenberg 1984; Zheng 1987). 
 
The Regulations included flexible labor laws meant to benefit foreign investors, something 
that was unique to the SEZs. Companies could recruit workers themselves rather than having 
	  57	  
them assigned by the government, and firms could at least in theory dismiss workers. This 
possibility was unheard of in China, where the system of the “Iron rice bowl” guaranteed 
lifelong employment and benefits (Fenwick 1984: 391). Article 20 of the Regulations states: 
 
“The staff and workers employed by enterprises in the special zones are to be managed by the 
enterprises according to their business requirements and, when necessary, may be dismissed, 
after going through the procedures provided in the labor contracts” (Novexcn.com n.d.). 
 
However, despite what the Regulations laid out in theory, in practice it was harder to actually 
hire workers independent of SEZ authorities of firing employees. Promoting efficiency and 
productivity were difficult and the local labor force was unproductive, despite efforts at 
training and skill upgrading. While SEZ wages were lower than in nearby Hong Kong, they 
were still higher than anywhere else in China. These problems and the unhappy investors 
they caused called for solutions. The Provisional Labor and Wage Regulations of 1982 gave 
employers increased possibilities of sanctioning employees through warnings, wage 
reductions, and dismissals, and also facilitated higher efficiency and productivity through 
bonuses (Fenwick 1984). 
 
6.3 Reasons for SEZs Establishment and Their Influence 
on China´s Economy 
The Chinese leadership did not state clearly why they chose to establish the SEZs, but talked 
somewhat vaguely about the “Three Principles” of attracting foreign investments, promoting 
exports, and developing industry as reasons for creating the zones (Wu 1985: 134). The SEZs 
were supposed to assist China in accomplishing the “Four Modernizations”, and accomplish 
the goal of catching up with the capitalist world by 2049, the 100th anniversary of 
communism in China (Gross 1988: 24; Oborne 1986). 
 
Many of the reasons behind the establishment of EPZs in other countries were also evident in 
China. In the past two decades before China established its SEZs, the results of EPZs in a 
number of other countries had been studied. The Chinese state wanted to attract FDI, conduct 
controlled, economic experiences in geographically limited areas, import more advanced 
technologies, knowledge and managerial skills, promote manufactured exports according to 
its comparative advantages, upgrade its industrial structure, increase employment, and create 
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spillover effects to nearby areas and the country as a whole (Ge 1999; Pissula and Lösch 
1990; Vogel 2013; Wong and Chu 1984). 
 
The first four SEZs were located at the coast for several reasons. It was a deliberate strategy 
to develop the coastal areas, and the SEZs could kick start that strategy. The zones could 
benefit from their location close to the more developed areas of Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan, which could provide capital and better technology. They could also take advantage 
of the many potential overseas Chinese investors in these areas (Park 1997). The SEZs gave 
China the opportunity to show that they were capable of developing capitalist areas inside 
mainland China, demonstrating to Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan that the strategy of “one 
country, two systems” had something to it (Leng 2009). Hong Kong was to be given back to 
China from Great Britain in 1997, and although Macao and Taiwan didn’t have a set date for 
reintegration with the mainland, they were probably on the minds of the Chinese policy 
makers as well. 
 
Generally speaking, the SEZs have been a success. They contributed to the rebuilding of an 
economy left in shambles by Mao, and played a part in transforming the economic system 
and introducing capitalism to China. The Chinese SEZs were important both to China´s 
economic growth and because they played a role as capitalist laboratories. Table 3 illustrates 
the GDP development of the zones. 
 
Table 3: Real GDP in the First Four SEZs in RMB Billion. Various Years. 
 
Source: Yeung, Lee, and Kee 2009: 228. Numbers compiled from various official Chinese statistical yearbooks. 
 
Year SEZ 
 Shenzhen Zhuhai Shantou Xiamen 
1978 - - - 0.48 
1979 0.196 0.209 - - 
1980 - - 1.097 - 
1990 17.167 4.143 7.245 5.709 
2000 218.745 33.143 45.016 50.187 
2006 581.356 74.770 73.738 116.082 
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The GDP of the four initial SEZs grew much after their establishment. Around the time the 
SEZs were created, their GDP was negligible and only in Shantou did it hover around the 
RMB one billion mark. Some 26 years after their creation, the GDP of two zones were on the 
way to reaching RMB 100 billion, one had already grown past that figure, while that of 
Shenzhen had even surpassed RMB 500 billion. The success of the Chinese SEZs stands in 
contrast to the performance of the Asian EPZs, which had more mixed results (Amirahmadi 
and Wu 1995). In 2006, just the four initial zones plus the Hainan SEZ accounted for 5 % of 
China´s total real GDP (Zeng 2011: 13). 
 
6.3.1 The SEZs Allowed China to Conduct Economic Experiments in 
Controlled “Laboratories” While Gradually Opening up the Economy 
While the SEZs affected many areas of China´s economy and economic system, perhaps their 
most substantial role was that of being laboratories for a new economic system. The early 
SEZs slightly opened the door to the world economy. At the same time, the Chinese state 
remained in control because it limited the economic experiments to certain small and 
backward geographical areas, ensuring that the capitalist ideology would not spread too fast 
or uncontrollably into the country as a whole. In addition, China spans an enormous 
geographical area where some parts are more developed than others. Implementing new 
economic reforms all over the country at the same time would not have been ideal, as the 
degree of success likely would have varied from one area to another based on the level of 
development. China simply didn’t have the resources to pursue the development of many 
regions simultaneously (Zheng 1987). 
 
With the creation of SEZs, China could assure its sovereignty, control foreign investments, 
and not have to obey a system of unequal treaties. Because foreign powers have controlled 
parts of China in the past, it was crucial that the SEZ experiment was not perceived as a 
repetition of history. If the initial controlled economic experiments proved successful, the 
Chinese leadership could implement the desired elements of the new economic policy to 
other areas of the country (Amirahmadi and Wu 1995; Ge 1999; Pissula and Lösch 1990; 
Stoltenberg 1984). The average Chinese wanted an improvement in the standard of living, 
and economic reforms had to be implemented in order to achieve that goal. Deng probably 
understood that uncontrolled reforms and the possibility of instability could seriously 
undermine the party. I believe many people in democratic societies overestimate the desire 
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for democracy in China, and underestimate the need for stability. While the pressure for 
democratic reforms have become more important with China´s improved economy, and will 
continue to grow in the future, stability, order and economic growth were arguably more 
important than democracy to most Chinese in the late 1970s. Implementing capitalist policies 
in a controlled manner enabled China to achieve economic growth and open up to the world 
while at the same time ensuring political and economic stability. 
 
A number of economic experiments were carried out in the SEZs, especially in the area of 
foreign trade. After decades with a closed economic system, foreign capital and firms were 
allowed into China, as well as their production techniques, technology, and management 
strategies. Other policies first tried out in the SEZs were reforms of the inefficient SOEs, the 
development of markets for stocks and bonds, an improved legal structure, bureaucratic 
reforms increasing efficiency and simplifying regulations and rules, and a more market-
friendly economic environment (Ge 1999). 
 
6.3.2 The SEZs as “Windows” to the World and Tools for Increasing 
Exports 
The SEZs acted as “windows” to the outside. The limited geographical extension of the initial 
SEZs made it easier for China to keep tabs on what the foreign companies did in terms of 
technological upgrading, innovation, and strategies for improving distribution, management, 
and efficiency. As well as giving Chinese officials the opportunity to look outside, foreign 
investors could also look in and learn more about the business policies in the zones and how 
the Chinese market functioned (Zheng 1987). 
 
China wished to increase exports when the economic reforms were implemented, as stated in 
the Trial Measures Concerning the Promotion of Exports by Importation of 1979: “In order 
to carry out the general task of the new period and to shift the focus of the work on to the 
track of socialist modernization, foreign trade should be greatly expanded and developed. 
Exports must be greatly increased for the purpose of introducing new technology and 
importing equipment in complete sets” (The Asian Legal Information Institute n.d.A). 
 
Under the Open Door policy, the goal of increasing exports was to be achieved through the 
development of China´s coastal areas, transforming and upgrading their industrial structure 
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and rapidly increasing their ability to export. Also the Regulations expressed the desire for 
increased export activity. Article 9 reads: 
 
“A joint venture is encouraged to market its products outside China. Export products may be 
distributed to foreign markets through the joint venture directly or through associated 
agencies, and they may also be distributed through China's foreign trade 
agencies” (Novexcn.com n.d.). 
 
The revenue from exports could be used to finance the imports China needed in its industry 
and export sector, and allow it to import more advanced foreign technology. Imports and 
exports were dependent on each other. Like the incentives given to foreign investors in order 
to attract FDI, various preferential policies were established to increase the productivity of 
exporting businesses, such as duty-free imports, exemption from commercial taxes, and 
allowing them to retain higher parts of their foreign exchange earnings (Yee 1992). The 
development of the coastal areas was part of the overall strategy of strengthening the Chinese 
economy, and this goal has been achieved with the assistance of the SEZs. Xiamen and 
Shenzhen has been transformed from small, backwards areas to major economic centers, and 
large parts of coastal China is far more developed than other regions today. Table 4 briefly 
illustrates the export performance of the SEZs. It shows how SEZ exports rose rapidly after 
the beginning of the economic reforms. Their share of total Chinese exports have been very 
high, above 70 % after 1985 and even surpassing 90 % in 2005. 
 
Table 4: Export Performance of China and Chinese SEZs, USD Million. 1980-2005. 	  
Source: Xu 2011: 1114. Numbers compiled from various official Chinese statistical yearbooks. 
Note: number of SEZs at the time in parenthesis. 
Year Total Chinese Exports (USD 
Million) 
SEZ Exports (USD 
Million) 
SEZ Share of Total 
Exports (%) 
1980 18.119 278 (4) 1.5 
1985 27.350 24.327 (77) 89.0 
1990 62.091 44.602 (290) 71.8 
1995 148.780 124.692 (341) 83.8 
2000 249.203 228.779 (341) 91.8 
2005 761.953 709.373 (342) 93.1 
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6.3.3 The SEZs as Attractors of FDI Through Policies and Incentives 
The technological gap created by Mao’s self-reliance policy meant that China had to 
welcome foreign technology and FDI, and policies were developed in order to attract these 
elements. Because what has been argued as being the most effective way to attract FDI, a 
fully open and free market, was not an option for China, the SEZs were to play the role of 
FDI-attracting hubs (Amirahmadi and Wu 1995; Fan 1998; Luo 2001; Pissula and Lösch 
1990). 
 
In order to create FDI inflows, incentives were given to foreign investors. FDI can be 
beneficial through creating positive spillover effects, facilitate the implementation of more 
advanced technology and better management, increase human capital and tax revenue, 
provide competition that improves the capability and strategy of local firms, and pressure 
local policy makers to develop the domestic business environment (Knoth 2000). At the time 
of the establishment of the SEZs, China had limited public revenue, a shortage of foreign 
currency and fiscal deficits. Creating the SEZs was a good way for the state to attract desired 
foreign capital and currency and at the same time not having to use too much of its own 
capital resources. In return for investing, investors got access to cheap labor as well as 
experiences with and opportunities in the emerging and potentially highly profitable Chinese 
market (Martellaro and Sun 1987; Profaizer 1993). 
 
JVs and FDI were first allowed in 1979 when the National People´s Congress adopted the 
Law of The People´s Republic of China on Joint Venture Using Chinese and Foreign 
Investment (The Asian Legal Information Institute n.d. B). Article 1 states: 
 
“With a view to expanding international economic co-operation and technical exchange, the 
People's Republic of China permits foreign companies, enterprises, other economic 
organizations or individuals […] to joint with Chinese companies, enterprises or other 
economic organizations […] in establishing joint ventures in the People's Republic of 
China”. 
 
The Law on Joint Ventures required a minimum 25 % foreign equity share. Illustrating the 
different legal and policy environments of the SEZs, the Regulations governing the zones did 
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not require this. The SEZ administrators could approve foreign investments and regulate 
industrial activity in the zones, and JVs did not need authorization from the Foreign 
Investment Commission (Fenwick 1984: 382-383). 
 
The Chinese government invited FDI to partake in its economy to a bigger extent than what 
was the case in most other countries using economic zones as an instrument to attract foreign 
capital. While foreign investments usually flowed mainly to labor-intensive industries in 
other economic zones, article 4 of the Regulations invited FDI to a host of different sectors in 
the SEZs. Besides the great desire for foreign investments in itself, one of the reasons for 
encouraging FDI to many different sectors of the economy was because it was needed in the 
development and maintenance of the SEZs. Local governments were unsure about the 
assistance they would receive from the central leadership, and foreign investments were thus 
important in financing the zones (Fenwick 1984). 
 
Establishing the first SEZs in proximity to more developed areas was done in order to make 
them attractive places to invest. Shenzhen is located only a short distance from Hong Kong, 
Zhuhai is close to Macao, Xiamen lies across the strait of Taiwan, and Shantou reap the 
benefits of being the home to a large population of overseas Chinese. This proximity made it 
easier for investors to control their projects in the SEZs. The scarcity of land and labor in a 
place like Hong Kong made the SEZs attractive places to relocate labor-intensive industries, 
with their low price on real estate and labor (Ota 2003; Pissula and Lösch 1990; Wu 1985; 
Zheng 1987). 
 
Special Incentives Given to Foreign Investors 
The economic incentives usually seen in EPZs, given in order to attract investments, were 
also present in the Chinese SEZs. The public sector took responsibility for improving such 
elements as the infrastructure, legal framework, and bureaucratic procedures in the SEZs (Ge 
1999). Components needed for industrial activities in the SEZs were to be duty free, as 
outlined in article 13 of the Regulations:  
 
“Machinery and equipment, spare parts, raw and semi-processed materials, means of 
transportation and other capital goods required for production imported by enterprises in the 
special zones shall be exempted from import duties” (Novexcn.com n.d.). 
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This translated into a better, more efficient business environment with lower costs of 
production and a greater potential for profits for the foreign investor. Of course, the large and 
low-paid labor force in China was also beneficial to foreign companies. Enterprises in 
Guangdong and Fujian were taxed less than companies elsewhere in China, and sometimes 
they received tax exemptions or tax holidays for a period of time. For example were 
corporations in the SEZs taxed only 15 % of their profits, as outlined in article 14 of the 
Regulations, compared to the 33 % profit tax levied on JVs outside the zones. Foreign 
enterprises that were not JVs were taxed 30-50 %. Hong Kong´s corporate profit tax was 17 
% (Fenwick 1984: 383). The individual SEZ established its own tax rules in addition to the 
tax policy incorporated uniformly in the zones (Zheng 1987). In order to stimulate foreign 
investors to keep their money in the China, article 16 gave investors reinvesting in the zones 
for more than five years the possibility of applying for a tax exemption on profits made from 
such reinvestments (Novexcn.com n.d.). On the first day of 2008, foreign companies in China 
did no longer receive special tax benefits. A 25 % single corporate tax was approved. 
However, firms in high-tech and other highly prioritized industries did still continue to 
benefit from a five-year transition phase (Abraham et al. 2010: 144; Gross 1988). 
 
Local suppliers inside the zones were not protected in the same manner as those outside, but 
firms using locally produced components were given discounts and favorable terms of 
payments: 
 
“Enterprises in the special zones are encouraged to use machinery and equipment, raw and 
semi-processed materials and other goods and materials produced in our country, and 
preferential prices will be offered on the basis of our country's current export prices for the 
same kinds of commodities, using foreign exchange to settle accounts” (Novexcn.com n.d., 
article 17). 
 
Exported products manufactured in the zones were also exempt from duties, but in Shenzhen, 
for example, materials imported from the inland and simply processed in the SEZs were not 
included. After initially requiring foreign investors to have Chinese partners, policies 
allowing the establishment of wholly owned foreign enterprises were implemented from 
1986. Rents on land lease were low, and foreign investors were allowed to lease land for am 
extended period of time, and labor regulations were less strict in the SEZs than in the rest of 
the country. In general, the bureaucratic and administrative system was simplified and it was 
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given financial incentives to foreign investors, making it both less complicated and more 
profitable to invest in China (Gross 1988; Varum et al. 2007; Wall 1993; Zheng 1987). 
 
Despite all the positive incentives offered to foreign investors, it can be argued that these 
were not very important, and that FDI would have flowed to China anyway. Huang and 
Shirai (1994) find that many developing countries experienced low initial inflows of FDI 
despite government policies actively seeking to attract foreign investments. Due to an 
uncertain investment environment in developing countries, foreign investors act cautiously 
and government incentives might not be enough to attract FDI. McKinsey Global Institute 
(2003) does not find evidence that such incentives are useful tools for creating economic 
value. Rather, it is argued that governments instead should strengthen the competitive 
environment, enforce law and regulations evenly, and develop a strong physical and legal 
infrastructure. China´s cheap and abundant labor, coupled with its potentially enormous and 
profitable market, could have been sufficient enough in itself to attract FDI. Table 5 
summarizes some of the incentives given to foreign investors in the Law on JVs and in the 
Regulations, and how they benefited both the foreign investor and China. 
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Table 5: Important Incentives in the Law on Joint Ventures and in the Regulations, and How They Benefited 
Both Foreign Investors and China 	  	  
	  	  
Source: The Asian Legal Institute n.d. B; Novexcn.com n.d. 
Year Law 
 
Article Content Benefits to 
Foreign Investors 
Benefits for 
China 
1979 Law on JVs 2 Protect profits and 
investments 
Protection of 
investments 
Increase FDI due to 
confident investors 
1979 Law on JVs 7 Reduction/exemption of 
income tax for high-
tech firms, first 2-3 
profitable years 
Less tax, higher profits Exposure to high 
technology 
1979 
and 
1980 
Law on JVs 
and 
Regulations on 
SEZs 
7  
and 
 16 
Tax refund if net profits 
are reinvested 
Profitable to reinvest Keeping FDI in 
China 
1979 
and 
1980 
Law on JVs 
and 
Regulations on 
SEZs 
10  
and 
 15 
Allow profits to be 
remitted abroad through 
Bank of China 
Possibility of taking 
profits out of China 
Increased activity 
for Bank of China 
1980 Regulations on 
SEZs 
4 Allow FDI to a number 
of sectors 
Possibilities in many 
sectors 
Maximize total 
FDI inflows 
1980 Regulations on 
SEZs 
5 Take responsibility for 
various infrastructural 
developments 
Necessary 
infrastructure is 
provided 
Make it attractive 
to invest, improve 
infrastructure 
1980 Regulations on 
SEZs 
12 Provide land at 
preferential rates 
Access to land at 
preferential rates 
Make it attractive 
to invest, maintain 
control over 
Chinese land 
1980 Regulations on 
SEZs 
13 Duty-free import of 
necessary components 
Save money on 
necessary imports 
Increase total FDI 
1980 Regulations on 
SEZs 
14 Tax rate 15 %, extra 
incentives to early/high-
tech/high-investing 
firms 
Save money due to less 
tax 
Increase total FDI, 
induce higher 
investments, 
exposure to high 
technology 
1980 Regulations on 
SEZs 
17 Preferential rates on 
locally produced 
components 
Save money on cheaper 
components 
Greater activity for 
local producers 
1980 Regulations on 
SEZs 
19 Allow firms to test 
labor before 
employment 
Quality control of labor Make it attractive 
to invest and 
operate in China 
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The SEZs Were Successful in Attracting FDI 
The initial SEZs were quite successful in attracting FDI, and accounted for a big share of 
total FDI to China. They managed to attract bigger inflows of FDI than other Asian EPZs 
(Amirahmadi and Wu 1995). In 1981, FDI to the four initial SEZs represented almost 60 % 
of total FDI to China. Shenzhen alone attracted more than 50% of this (Yeung et al. 2009: 
224). In 1984, this number had decreased to 26 %, still a high number (Alder et al. 2012: 11). 
In 2005, China became the biggest FDI recipient among all the countries in the world (Xu 
2011: 1113). Table 6 illustrates FDI inflow to each of the four initial SEZs. 
 
Table 6: FDI to the Initial Four SEZs, 2009 USD Million. Various Years. 
 
Source: Yeung et al. 2009: 231. Numbers compiled from various official Chinese statistical yearbooks. 
 
While the FDI flows to the SEZs have been impressive, it has been an issue that the majority 
of FDI went to the coastal areas of China. Guangdong province alone received around 60 % 
of China´s total FDI in the first ten years after the reforms (Ota 2003: 9). This is something 
that has contributed to the big differences between Chinese provinces, an issue the 
government has tried to address through such strategies as the Western Development 
Strategy8. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For a more thorough description of the Western Development Strategy, see Lai 2002. 
Year SEZ 
 Shenzhen Zhuhai Shantou Xiamen 
1979 5.48 - - - 
1980 - - 1.61 - 
1990 389.94 69.1  98.09 72.37 
2000 1,961.45 815.18 165.61 1,031.50 
2006    954.61 
2007 3,662.17 1,028.83 171.62 - 
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Sources of FDI 
From the creation of the SEZs, the intention was to attract FDI from Hong Kong and Macao, 
as well as from the Chinese diaspora in other countries. Between 1979-2003, a large majority 
of 72.7 % of FDI to China came from Hong Kong. However, it is likely that a proportion of 
this came from Taiwan, funneled through Hong Kong for political reasons, and from the 
mainland recycled through Hong Kong in order to profit from the government´s incentives to 
foreign investors. Taiwan accounted for 9.3 % of total FDI, while Macao represented 2.9 %, 
and Singapore with its large Chinese population 2.3 % over the period (Fan 1998: 24; Wei 
1993: 7). Other than reasons such as proximity to the mainland, its cheap labor, and the 
preferential policies towards foreign investors, another possible reason why Hong Kong 
represented a substantial share of FDI could have been because the Regulations was created 
with Hong Kong in mind (Fenwick 1984). 
 
6.3.4 The SEZs as Tools to Create Spillover Effects 
The presence of foreign corporations and FDI has been sought after by the governments of 
many developing countries, due to its potential for creating spillover effects such as 
implementation of advanced technology, know-how, and managing practices. Spillovers can 
benefit not only the domestic partner of a joint venture, but also other producers in the same 
region or sector through an increased demand for components (Abraham et al. 2010; Moura 
and Forte 2010). Domestic labor might benefit from the presence of foreign firms, as these 
tend to pay higher wages than local employers (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2002). 
 
Incentives were given to foreign investors that could expose China to advanced technology. 
One such policy was laid out in article 7 of the Law on Joint Ventures: 
 
“A joint venture that possesses advanced technology by world standards may apply for a 
reduction of or exemption from income tax for the first two to three profit-making years” 
(The Asian Legal Information Institute n.d.B). 
 
Such policies could expose China to advanced technology it did not have the capacity to 
develop itself. However, much of the activities of foreign firms in the SEZs were of a simple 
nature, and foreign firms can be reluctant to give away their comparative advantage of 
possessing better technology. It is difficult to assess the potential positive spillover effects 
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created by FDI and the presence of foreign corporations. One way to identify positive 
spillovers is to consider the growth in the number of companies operating in high-tech 
industries in the SEZs, but such a statistic does not isolate the effects of FDI. A detailed 
description of the positive effects FDI and foreign companies have had on the technological 
and industrial structures of China is outside the scope of this thesis. However, through an 
analysis of the available literature it is attempted to broadly illustrate how foreign firms and 
investments have benefited China´s economy, industry and technology. 
 
Wang (2009) argues that the creation of the SEZs has contributed to more advanced 
technology coming to China, and that the SEZ policies increased FDI by 58 %. Liu´s (2008) 
analysis of a large sample of Chinese firms finds that the overall contribution by FDI has 
been positive, because it created technology transfers. Abraham et al. (2010) claim that 
Chinese firms partnering with a foreign firm are more productive, and that domestic firms in 
the manufacturing industry can benefit from the presence of foreign firms. Liu´s (2002) 
findings, based on data from manufacturing industries in the Shenzhen SEZ between 1993-
1998, show that FDI might have had positive spillover effects through creating higher 
productivity growth rates in manufacturing industries. OECD (2000) finds that FDI has 
created jobs in China, upgraded skills because FDI firms use a bigger share of its workers in 
the production process, increased productivity levels and transferred technology, upgraded 
the industrial structure, and increased competition and industrial performance. Long (2005) 
reviews a number of studies and finds that FDI caused an increase in technological 
capabilities. Better technology from foreign firms has contributed to filling technological 
gaps, and increased competition has upgraded China´s technological level. Favorable policies 
towards R&D have caused foreign firms to conduct such activities in China, and exposed it to 
more advanced technology. The use of local producers by foreign enterprises, and the quality 
requirements towards them, has also created positive spillovers to domestic manufacturers. 
 
High-tech spillovers to China might have been limited, because FDI to high-tech industries 
has been scarce, at least up until the mid-1990s. On of the reasons for this has been that the 
majority of FDI to China came from less developed areas such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
and been invested in low- or medium-tech industries. The technological spillovers gained 
were nonetheless positive as they represented better technology than China had at the time, 
despite that it was less advanced than in the Western world. In addition, China gained 
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experienced in the light consumer industries that Hong Kong and Taiwan had developed 
several years earlier (Chen, Chang, and Zhang 1995). 
 
While most of the FDI to China has come from countries that are not among the most 
technologically advanced, there are still high-tech producers in these areas, and one cannot 
exclude the possibility of high-tech spillovers. Additionally, China did receive FDI from 
more developed countries as well. The sources of FDI to China have been shifting since 
1993, which might have had a positive effect on the transfer of more advanced technology 
(OECD 2000). One should not overlook spillover effects not related to economic growth or 
technological development, such as the demonstration effects foreign companies have had on 
Chinese firms. It exposed domestic producers to international competition and forced them to 
pay attention to such things as product quality, production costs and management strategies 
(Chen et al. 1995). 
 
Spillovers and FDI are Not Always Positive 
Although FDI can positively influence a developing country in a number of ways, it does not 
have to be entirely beneficial to the recipient country. Some of the anticipated positive 
spillovers from FDI might turn out to be more nuanced when analyzed further. Nournoff 
(1988: 209, as referenced in Knoth 2000: 93) list some negative aspects associated with the 
flow of FDI to China: 
 
1) The technology China received was outdated and backwards, and not high-tech. 
2) The value of that technology was not as great as it was estimated. 
3) Some imported components were locally available at a better price, and some imports
 were actually exported from China first. 
4) Foreigners exploited Chinese negotiators. 
5) China was underestimating the value of its contributions to the JVs. 
 
The findings by Hale and Long (2011) contradict Liu´s argument that FDI creates 
productivity spillovers to China, claiming that many such estimates are exaggerated. 
Abraham et al. (2010) argue that only those economic zones with the specific aim of 
developing China´s own high-tech industries were positively influencing the domestic 
market, thus casting doubt on the positive spillovers effects from foreign firms in the SEZs. 
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6.3.5 The SEZs as Tools for Reintegrating Overseas Areas 
Locating the SEZs next to Hong Kong, Macao, and the politically delicate island of Taiwan, 
was done partly in order to take advantage of the more developed industries and economies in 
these areas. However, this was not the only reason. Reintegrating Taiwan and Hong Kong as 
parts of China has been high on the Chinese foreign policy agenda for a long time. Knowing 
that the 100-year lease of Hong Kong to Great Britain was due to expire in 1997, it was 
important for the CCP to show their ability to create prosperity and stability in the SEZs. As 
Hong Kong had a developed capitalist economy, the market-oriented economies of the SEZs 
could help calm Hong Kong´s fears of being reunited with China. Hence, one reason for 
directing greater efforts at developing the Shenzhen SEZ compared to the other three initial 
zones was its convenient location right next to Hong Kong (Fenwick 1984; Gross 1988; Park 
1997; Zheng 1987). 	  
Macao´s reunification with the mainland was not decided before 1987 (Filseth and Næverdal 
2013), and Taiwan still hasn’t been reunited with China. As such it is hard to know if the 
reunification of these areas was considered directly when the zones were created. However, 
their future was probably something the Chinese leadership had in mind when deciding the 
locations of the SEZs. 
 
6.4 The Case of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
In order to illustrate in greater detail how the SEZs contributed to the Chinese economic 
growth and the development of China´s economic system, I will briefly consider the case of 
the Shenzhen SEZ. Of the four initial SEZs, Shenzhen has been the zone developing most 
rapidly and achieving the highest rates of economic growth. It occupied the biggest 
geographical area, had the most established legal framework early on, and was in many ways 
the frontrunner of the initial SEZs. It had the greatest freedom to innovate, and policies later 
adopted in other zones were often first tried out in Shenzhen (Yeung et. al 2009; Zheng 
1987). As it performed better than the other initial SEZs, in one respect it can be argued that 
Shenzhen is not representative of China´s SEZs. At the same time, Shenzhen was not the only 
SEZ that grew faster than China overall. Much of the positive impact Shenzhen had on the 
Chinese economy has also been evident in other zones. Thus it can be argued that the case of 
the Shenzhen SEZ in fact can shed light on other SEZs as well. 
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6.4.1 Developments in the Shenzhen SEZ 
Earlier in this chapter, I have gone over the main developments of the Chinese SEZs, their 
establishment, and the policies towards them. Much of that analysis also applies to the 
Shenzhen SEZ. While the SEZs were generally established for the same reasons, they were 
not uniform in all aspects. A disadvantage of Shenzhen was its scarce population and its lack 
of an industrial base, but at the same time it was the biggest of the initial four zones and 
enjoyed a huge advantage in being located next to the more developed city of Hong Kong. 
The relative decentralized administrative policies towards the SEZs were also evident in 
Shenzhen. In 1981 it was granted the same status as the provincial capital of Guangzhou, and 
in 1988 it received provincial status concerning matters of economic planning (Yeung et al. 
2009: 229). 
 
Experimenting With New Policies 
Shenzhen experimented with many different policies before the rest of China and the other 
SEZs. This might have been one important factor leading to the better economic performance 
of this particular zone. Some of Shenzhen´s earliest reforms happened in the land market, and 
it was the first to commercialize residential land. Its price system was reformed in 1980, and 
the banking system was liberalized. It allowed the establishment of the first foreign bank in 
China in 1982 (Yuan, Guo, Xu, Li, Luo, Lin, and Yuan 2010: 64-65). It experimented with 
wage reform much earlier than the rest of China, and adjusted the labor-contract system in 
line with a changing economic system. These important initial reforms introduced the market 
forces to the planned economy and laid out the course of future reforms (Yeung et al. 2009; 
Yuan et al. 2010). 
 
Eventually, more comprehensive reforms were introduced. State-owned land was made 
available for private use, and the price and management reforms were further extended. 
Entrepreneurship in high-tech industries was encouraged, and in 1986 the local government 
carried out early reforms of the SOEs, turning them into joint-stock companies. It established 
China´s first stock exchange in 1990. From 1992, the focus was on institutional reforms. The 
tradition of government job allocation was altered, a minimum wage and other worker and 
social protections were established, and the management of public utilities was strengthened. 
In 1997, the reforms were further deepened with the sale of industrial land, the establishment 
of a high-tech market, and reforms in the way the government allocated resources (Yuan et 
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al. 2010: 65-72). Shenzhen was perhaps the SEZ that to the biggest extent acted as a capitalist 
laboratory, as many of the successful policies and laws of the zone were later implemented 
on a nation-wide scale. 
 
6.4.2 GDP Growth 
Shenzhen´s GDP grew at 54 % in the period 1980-1984, right after it was set up (Alder et al. 
2012: 11). The zone managed to maintain a very high growth rate also in the next decades; its 
GDP grew on average 25.3 % annually, while its GDP per capita grew at an annual rate of 
11.8 % on average between 1979-2010 (Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2011: 5, table 1-3). In 
the same period, China´s GDP grew at 10 % on average per year (World Bank 2014). While 
the other initial zones grew less than Shenzhen, it was not the only SEZ growing faster than 
the national economy. Shenzhen and the other SEZs achieved the goal of acting as 
locomotives for economic growth. 
 
Figure 5: Growth in Shenzhen´s GDP, RMB 10,000. 1979-2010. 
 
 
 
Source: Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2011: 5, table 1-3. 
 
6.4.3 Exports and Imports 
Between 1979-1994, Shenzhen´s exports increased 1969 times, growing at a yearly rate of 75 
% (Ge 1999: 1278). In 1979, its total exports amounted to USD 9.3 million, while imports 
stood at USD 7.46 million. Hence, the total foreign trade was quite limited. In 2010, these 
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numbers had risen to USD 204.18 trillion for exports and USD 142.57 trillion for imports, an 
almost unbelievable growth. The average annual growth from 1979-2010 was 33.6 % for 
exports and 32.6 % for imports (Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2011: 7, table 1-3). Its share 
of total Chinese exports was 0 % in 1979, and 14 % in 2007. That year was the 15th 
consecutive year it was the number one exporting city in China (Knoth 2000: 106, Yeung et 
al. 2009: 231). Shenzhen has been a very important tool for increasing China´s exports and 
foreign trade. 
 
6.4.4 Employment 
While employment has increased in all the SEZs, it has grown remarkably in Shenzhen. The 
zone employed only 139,500 people in 1979, but in 2010 this figure had increased to over 7 
million. Total employed persons grew on average 13.5 % annually in this period (Shenzhen 
Statistical Yearbook 2011: 4, table 1-3). Thus also the goal of creating employment has been 
something the Shenzhen SEZ has achieved (Tantri 2013). With much unemployment and 
poverty, and many people employed in low-paid jobs and in the agricultural sector, China 
needed the jobs created by the SEZs. 
 
6.4.5 FDI 
Shenzhen´s inflow of actually used FDI rose rapidly between 1979 and 2010, from USD 10 
million to USD 4.3 billion (Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2011: 293, table 13-4). The 
growth in FDI to Shenzhen has been impressive, but its share of total FDI to China has 
declined over the same period, from 4.5 % to 3.7 %, despite reaching levels between 10 % 
and 15 % in the 1980s (Knoth 2000: 108). The Shenzhen SEZ has been successful in 
attracting FDI, one of the objectives it was hoped it would fulfill. After the initial SEZs were 
established, various economic zones have been set up, and the Chinese economy has 
generally been liberalized. A natural consequence of these developments was that Shenzhen´s 
share of total FDI to China decreased. 
 
Similar to the pattern of FDI inflows to China and the SEZs in general, also for Shenzhen 
was Hong Kong the dominant source of foreign investments. Examining the sources of 
foreign investments to Shenzhen in the period 1979-1995, USD 6.14 million came from 
Hong Kong, and it is estimated that it represented around 90 % of Shenzhen´s FDI in its first 
five years (Ota 2003: 18-19; Wong 1987, as referenced in Ota 2003: 19). Locating Shenzhen 
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in proximity to this area contributed to making it an important source of FDI, something that 
was the goal of an intended strategy. Cheap labor and preferential FDI policies also made 
Shenzhen an attractive place to invest. However, while all the SEZs had preferential policies, 
Shenzhen adopted additional measures not found in the other zones (Wei 2000; Yeung et al. 
2009). 
 
6.4.6 Why Has Shenzhen Been the Most Successful Initial SEZ? 
As presented in table 3, by 2006 the GDP of the Shenzhen SEZ was much higher than the 
other three initial zones. It has developed the most and has the strongest economy of the four 
initial SEZs. Some reasons why Shenzhen performed better than the other zones can be 
pointed to. Perhaps the most obvious reason is its location close to Hong Kong. As this has 
been the biggest source of FDI to China, being located close to it has naturally been an 
advantage. The contribution of FDI to total fixed assets investments has generally been 
higher in Shenzhen than in other areas of China, and it has been the number one exporting 
city in the country for a number of years. Shenzhen had more freedom to innovate and 
experiment with new policies than the other zones. It was not only the first SEZ, but also the 
first city in China to implement a number of important policies. The numerous early policy 
experiments laid the foundation for the development of Shenzhen´s market and institutional 
framework. Shenzhen´s local government also seemingly performed better than the 
governments of other zones. Not only did it implement successful policies early on, but it 
also shifted its focus to more technology-intensive industries when the costs of land and labor 
rose. It avoided elements of bad governance evident in other SEZs. For example, Zhuhai´s 
infrastructure was overbuilt, and the construction of its excessive airport used up too much of 
its capital resources. Shantou experienced scandals related to such negative elements as 
corruption and smuggling (Zeng 2011). Additionally, Shenzhen successfully managed to 
upgrade its industrial structure and enhance its technological capabilities, and high-tech 
rather than labor-intensive industries bear its economy today. Its technological capacity is one 
of the highest in China, and it is also the leading exporting city in the country (Wei 2000; 
Yeung et al. 2009). This is discussed further in the next chapter.  
 
6.5 China´s Development Without the SEZs 
In the past sections, it has been illustrated how the SEZs have contributed to the growth of 
the Chinese economy and the development of its economic system. As a follow-up to this, it 
	   76	  
is natural to question if China would have developed in the same manner had the SEZs not 
been established. In order to understand the roles of the SEZs in China´s development, one 
has to consider the outcome without them as well. 
 
The SEZs contributed to the development of the coastal areas at the expense of inland 
regions, something that has created big differences between respective parts of China. 
However, the coastal parts of China might have developed faster than other regions even 
without the SEZs. They had a comparative advantage in their location, production 
capabilities, and level of development, and it is probable that foreign investors would have 
established themselves at the coast even without the creation of the SEZs. 
 
As Wall (1993) and Huang and Shirai (1994) point to, the economic incentives in the zones 
might not have been that important in attracting FDI. It is natural to believe that China´s vast 
amount of cheap labor and enormous domestic market would have caused big FDI inflows 
anyway, both to China in general and especially to the coastal areas. While the SEZs 
probably contributed to the rapid development of the Chinese economy, they were not the 
only reason behind the economic growth. The ideas of Deng and the Chinese leadership after 
Mao were of such a nature that the economy probably would have been reformed and opened 
up in one way or another, with or without the SEZs. While FDI flows to the SEZs represented 
a major share of total FDI to China, they were not the only areas capable of attracting FDI. 
FDI to the zones accounted for between 29-25 % of total FDI flows to China in the years 
from 1984-1990 (Knoth 2000: 96). FDI did also flow to non-SEZs in the early years of the 
reforms, and the share of FDI to the zones decreased in the 1990s. 
 
However, I believe the SEZs benefited the economic development of China to a big extent, 
through speeding up the economic growth process, acting as economic laboratories allowing 
China to implement capitalism in a controlled manner, creating spillover effects, attracting 
FDI and foreign technology, and increasing exports. That being said, I believe China could 
have achieved high levels of economic growth even without the SEZs. It would have been 
more difficult, and probably resulted in less growth and a slower pace of development, but it 
would not have been impossible. The reform-minded and pragmatic leadership under Deng 
would have promoted economic reforms in one way or another. Establishing the SEZs were 
the right policy, but growth and development could also have been achieved without them, 
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although more time would probably have been required in order for China to reach its current 
level of development. 
 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
At the start of this chapter, I presented the following set of thesis questions: 
 
o What were the government´s policies towards the SEZs? 
o Why were the SEZs established and how did they contribute to China´s economic 
growth and the development of its economic system? 
 
It is difficult to identify a clear strategy of the Chinese government towards the SEZ, but it 
was characterized by pragmatism and a willingness to pursue economic growth and 
development through new, experimental policies. Ideology was less important than economic 
growth, and the Deng administration was not afraid of capitalist influences. Capitalism was 
justified by indirectly stating that it was combinable with socialism, using phrases such as 
“capitalism with Chinese characteristics”. 
 
The market was allowed to play a bigger role, and capitalism was introduced to China. The 
government emphasized autonomy for the SEZs, and decentralization was evident for the 
first time. The zones were to a big extent administered by local authorities, and had much 
freedom in how they operated. They were intended to be economic, capitalist laboratories in 
China, and thus quite extensive policies were introduced, both by central and local 
governments. Legal and regulatory frameworks were adopted, meant to assist the market 
economy and improve the conditions for foreign investors and private businesses in the 
zones. While much autonomy was given to the zones, Beijing probably had more control 
over them than what it might seem. The SEZs were to gradually introduce capitalism to 
China, but Beijing made sure that this happened in a controlled manner and that no 
uncontrolled or unintended consequences occurred. 
 
Increasing exports and FDI inflows were important goals of the SEZs, and in order to achieve 
them, the government´s strategy was to give flexibility and predictability to foreign investors, 
as well as various economic benefits and possibilities to both exporting firms and foreign 
investors. The presence of foreign firms was allowed, and Chinese-foreign JVs could be set 
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up. The coastal areas were intended to lead the export-oriented growth, and it was hoped that 
exports and FDI could assist China in upgrading its technology and industrial structure, 
improve the practices of domestic firms, create spillover effects, increase revenues of foreign 
currency, and create jobs. Increased exports could help pay for necessary imported 
components. Locating the SEZs on the coast was done partly because these areas had more 
experience with production, were more advanced, and had more skilled labor. It was also 
done in order to take advantage of overseas Chinese living in these areas. A non-economic 
part of the strategy towards the SEZs was to prepare Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan for 
reunification with the mainland, and show that China would allow them to keep their 
economic systems under the “one country, two systems” policy. 
 
The SEZs have without a doubt contributed much to the growth of the Chinese economy, and 
affected the changes seen in its economic system. The GDP of the zones grew rapidly, 
especially that of the Shenzhen SEZ. The SEZs accounted for a substantial share of China´s 
total GDP, and without them the Chinese economy would likely have grown less and slower. 
The SEZs represented a large share of total Chinese exports, something that contributed to 
increased revenue, employment, and foreign exchange accumulation, as well as the 
experience and knowledge the exporting firms gained. The SEZs were successful in attracting 
FDI, and especially in their early years did they attract the majority of FDI to China. While 
China likely would have received large FDI inflows even without the zones, the total amount 
of FDI could have been smaller. It is hard to assess the spillover effects from FDI, but other 
areas of China were likely positively affected by FDI and the presence of foreign firms in the 
SEZs. The Shenzhen SEZ performed better than the other initial zones, partly due to its 
location next to Hong Kong and its willingness to experiment with new policies not evident 
in other zones. 
 
The SEZs greatly affected the developments of China´s economic system through acting as 
capitalist laboratories. This allowed China to experiment with a new economic system 
without having to implement it nationwide. Many of the developments of the SEZs have later 
been implemented in other areas of China. As “windows to the world”, the SEZs exposed 
China to foreign technologies and know-how. The reunification with Hong Kong in 1997 
happened without many issues, something that the visible capitalist developments in the 
SEZs could have contributed to. I believe China would have achieved rapid economic growth 
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even without the SEZs, due to their pragmatic leadership, huge domestic market, and big and 
low-paid labor force, but that the economic growth would have been slower. 	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7 Developments in China´s Industrial Structure 
and How it Attempted to Upgrade It 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
This is the second of the two analytical chapters of this thesis. I present the following set of 
thesis questions the chapter seeks to answer: 
 
o Has China successfully managed to upgrade its industrial structure after 1978? 
o Have the attempts at upgrading it been in line with a comparative-advantage-
following or a comparative-advantage-defying strategy? 
 
After looking at how the industrial structure of China has developed after the economic 
reforms, I evaluate whether China has successfully managed to upgrade it. The chapter 
continues with an analysis of this process. The indicators are primarily policy statements and 
official Chinese data, if available. Have the attempts of upgrading been in line with a CAD or 
CAF strategy? I look closer at the developments of the auto and textile industries, which have 
developed quite differently. While the former has clear elements of a CAD strategy, the latter 
is more in line with a CAF strategy. Like in the first analytical chapter, I look at the case of 
the Shenzhen SEZ more in-depth. I assess the developments of the industrial structure of the 
zone, seeking to understand if its development strategy has been one resembling a CAF or a 
CAD strategy. This enables me to compare the developments in China and in the Shenzhen 
SEZ. 
 
7.1 Understanding the Developments in China´s 
Industrial Structure 
Today, no one is any longer overwhelmed by the economic growth China has experienced 
over the last decades, and in a way, China´s economic growth is “old news”. While there is 
some difference of opinion on the exact way China has developed, no one would argue that 
the country is an important player in the contemporary international economy.  
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Like the economy in general, the industrial structure of China has developed much after its 
economic opening-up. Understanding the developments in China´s industrial structure is 
valuable when evaluating its economic growth. It can also help us predict the future of 
China´s economy, as long as other factors such as China’s political development and 
financial and monetary positions are kept constant. The experiences of China might be of 
importance to the developing countries of today, helping them understand how they best can 
upgrade their industries and achieve economic growth. 
 
7.1.1 The Developments of China´s Industrial Structure 
Prior to the economic reforms, there was a limited amount of innovation in China. One 
problem was that the large SOEs, unlike private businesses in a free market, did not have to 
worry about such “unpractical” things as profits and innovation. They lacked the autonomy 
and desire to pursue innovation (Zhang, Zeng, Mako and Seward 2009). 
 
As stated earlier in this thesis, industrial growth under Mao was at times quite high. The 
reason why this was not very positive was that until the economic reforms, that growth was 
concentrated in a few industries, such as steel, coal, and electricity. Light industries increased 
much less than heavy industries, and luxury goods disappeared from the market. The 
technological capacity of the Chinese industry was low and it was highly capital-intensive, 
something that was not in accordance with China´s natural endowment structure at the time - 
abundant in labor, but with scarce capital resources. The economies of Japan and Taiwan, 
being successful when China was still under the rule of Mao, first focused on producing 
simple goods before moving on to more advanced products. China under Mao went the other 
way, and started with pursuing the development of more advanced industries. For example 
did textile and light industries decrease from a 64 % share of total industrial output in the 
1950s, to only 27 % in 1978. This would have been a natural development if it had started 
developing these products early on, and later moved into more advanced industries. The 
problem was that the underdeveloped and labor-intensive manufacturing industries were 
never properly developed in the first place (Naughton 2007: 330).  
 
Developing in “Reverse” 
The way China developed after the economic reforms was somewhat different to what many 
view as the natural course of market development: instead of moving up the value chain, it 
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has had to move back into the industries that was neglected under Mao. In the Chinese 
economy in the 1980s and early 1990s, the fastest growing sectors were light, labor-intensive 
industries (Naughton 2007). For example did production of electronics and communication 
equipment grow 28 % per year between 1980-1995, while furniture production grew at 21.9 
%, and production of plastic products, nonmetal mining, synthetic fibers, and wood products 
all grew at a rate above 20 % per year. In the same period, overall gross industrial output was 
14 % annually (Naughton 2007: 331). 
 
As the economy has been reformed and opened up, China has continued to develop its 
industrial structure, making it increasingly more sophisticated. Around the mid-1990s, the 
overall industrial restructuring towards simple consumer goods started to come to an end. 
Their share of total industrial output declined between 1995-2004, whereas the share of such 
products as electronics and telecommunication equipment rose. The share of machinery and 
electronics of total exports surpassed 50 % in 2003. This can point to a continuous industrial 
upgrading in China, and that it has produced increasingly more advanced products after its 
economic reforms began (Naughton 2007). 
 
Table 7: Developments in China´s Industrial Composition, as % of Total Industry. 1978-2012. 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2011: 12, table 1-3. 
 
Table 7 shows the developments in the composition of the three main industries of the 
Chinese economy between 1978-2010. Primary industry has declined greatly, the secondary 
industry has not changed much, while the tertiary industry has grown substantially. As the 
secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy are more capital-intensive and advanced than 
the primary sector, this can point to an upgrading of China´s industrial structure. One part of 
the secondary industry that has been notably upgraded is the export of manufactured goods. 
As shown in table 7, China has been exporting increasingly more sophisticated manufactures 
Year Primary industry Secondary industry Tertiary industry 
1978 28.2 47.9 23.9 
1990 27.1 41.3 31.6 
2000 15.1 45.9 39.0 
2010 10.1 46.8 43.1 
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after 1980. Not only does the changes in the composition of the three main sectors of the 
economy point to an industrial upgrading; also patterns of upgrading in the secondary sector 
of the economy are evident. Overall, manufacturing value added grew by 9.8 % annually 
between 1995-2005, a further illustration of a more advanced manufacturing sector (Vaidya, 
Bennett, and Liu 2007: 1001). 
 
7.1.2 Developments in the Export Sector 
After the start of the economic reforms, an initial expansion of exports came as a result of the 
government´s efforts, and an important export product was petroleum. Only between 1979-
1985, exports of oil and petroleum grew from 11.1 million metric tons to 36.2 million metric 
tons (Lardy 1992: 696). Despite being the biggest single exported product, representing 20 % 
of export earnings in 1985, the importance of petroleum decreased after the mid-1980s 
(Naughton 2007). The export of textiles and light manufactured goods rose rapidly, and as 
such China´s exports were increasingly shifting to industries were China had a comparative 
advantage. The composition of China´s exports was diversified and altered due to the reforms 
in the economic system, such as the decentralization of foreign trade, a reform in the pricing 
of traded goods, and reforms in the exchange rate and exchange control of the Chinese 
currency. Also the massive incentives given to exporting businesses and liberal regulations 
contributed to the rise of foreign trade. From the middle of the decade until its end, the share 
of capital-intensive primary exports were cut almost in half, whereas the share of more labor-
intensive manufactured products increased by around 50 %. By 1995, all the top exported 
products were labor-intensive goods (Lardy 1992; Naughton 2007). 
 
Figure 6: Growth in China´s Composition of Exports, USD Billion. 1980-2010. 
 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2011: 221, Table 6-4. 
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It has been argued that the changes in China´s export composition is the most direct reflector 
of an upgrading of its industrial sector (Yue and Evenett 2010). As seen in figure 6 above, 
China´s total exports have been growing rapidly since 1980. Manufactured exports represent 
almost the entire growth of total exports. Although the export of primary goods has risen as 
well, its development is nowhere near as spectacular as that of manufactured exports. 
 
Table 8: Share of Manufactured and Primary Goods as % of Total Chinese Exports. 1980-2010. 
 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2011: 221, table 6-4. 
 
Table 9: Composition of China´s Export of Manufactured Goods as % of Total. 1980-2010. 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2011: 221, table 6-4. 
Note: calculation of percentage undertaken by myself. 
 
Year Total exports Primary goods Manufactured goods 
1980 100 50.3 49.70 
1985 100 50.56 49.44 
1990 100 25.59 74.41 
1995 100 14.44 85.56 
2000 100 10.22 89.78 
2005 100 6.44 93.56 
2010 100 5.18 94.82 
 
Year Total export 
of 
manufactured 
goods 
Chemicals 
and related 
products 
L. textile, 
industrial/ 
rubber/metal 
prod., minerals 
Machinery 
and 
transport 
equipment 
Miscellaneous 
products 
Products 
not 
classified 
1980 100 12.44 44.41 9.36 31.49 2.30 
1985 100 10.04 33.23 5.71 25.78 25.24 
1990 100 8.07 27.22 12.09 27.46 25.16 
1995 100 7.14 25.33 24.67 42.85 0 
2000 100 5.41 19.02 36.92 36.95 0.10 
2005 100 5.02 18.11 49.41 27.24 0.23 
2010 100 5.85 16.65 52.15 25.24 0.10 
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Table 8 above illustrates how both primary and manufactured exports represented around 50 
% each of China´s total exports in 1980. This composition shifted rapidly after 1985, and in 
2010 primary goods represented a share of only 5.2 %, whereas manufactured goods 
accounted for 94.8 %. High-tech exports as a percentage of total manufactured exports 
increased from 6 % in 1992 to 26 % in 2011 (World Bank 2014). Table 9 shows the 
composition of various sub-categories of manufactured goods as a percentage of total exports 
of manufactured goods. Production of machinery and transport equipment are more 
technologically advanced than chemicals, textile, and metallurgical products. The changes 
illustrated in tables 8 and 9 can point to a move up the value chain and that China has 
upgraded its industrial structure and the products it export (Wong 2012).  
 
One major point of Rodrik (2006) is that China´s export bundle is more sophisticated than it 
“should” be if it was based on its comparative advantages, and that it resembles a country 
with a per capita income three times that of China (Rodrik 2006). Schott (2006) finds that 
China´s exports has increasingly overlapped with more developed countries in the period 
1972-2001. Its exports are more sophisticated than those of countries with similar relative 
factor endowments, and they have been increasingly similar to those of OECD countries. 
This points to the increased sophistication of China´s exports, and it indicates industrial and 
technological upgrading. However, a negative finding is that Chinese exports have been 
selling at increasingly lower prices than what could be assumed from its GDP levels. 
 
Cui and Syed (2007) argue that the typical view of China as the “world´s assembly line”, 
where cheap labor in coastal factories are assembling imported parts into products to be sold 
abroad, with limited value retained in China, might be wrong. This is due to the increased 
share of total exports by capital equipment and intermediate goods, illustrating China´s 
ability to produce more sophisticated products. They conclude their study by claiming that 
the traditionally strong relationship between imports and exports, as a result of processing 
trade, may be weakening due to increased production capabilities and FDI inflows. 
 
7.2 China´s Industrial Structure Has Been Upgraded, but 
Still Faces Challenges 
While one should not overstate the industrial development that has been happening in China 
after the economic reforms, one also has to recognize the progress the country has achieved. 
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Overall, the industrial structure of China has been upgraded and become more advanced, and 
China has successfully managed to move up the value chain. Manufacturing value added has 
grown rapidly after the start of the economic reforms, and China´s comparative advantages 
have been shifting. The heavy industries that were important under Mao have lost much of 
their significance after 1978, and labor-intensive manufacturing has gained momentum. 
China managed to develop the industries it neglected for many years, and those industries 
were more in accordance with its natural endowment structure and comparative advantages. 
The domestic value added ratio of China´s exports has increased, and it uses domestically 
produced rather than imported content to a bigger extent than before (Kee and Tang 2013). 
 
Much of the development in China´s industry resembles the experiences of the East Asian 
Tigers. Although individual national factors have affected how each country has developed, 
the earlier developers of East Asia also had to put in deliberate efforts at upgrading their 
industries. As such, the Chinese development is following a trend seen in nearby countries, 
an argument for why these countries can be grouped together in an EADM. However, while 
there are similarities in many aspects of the development of the East Asian countries, the 
scope of China´s manufacturing sector, and the effect it has had on world markets, is bigger 
than in the other countries (Yue and Evenett 2010).  
 
China Has Come a Long Way, but Will Have to Continue its Development 
While China has to a big extent managed to upgrade its industrial structure after 1978, it is 
still lagging behind more developed countries. Much of the goods produced in the country are 
in the lower end of the value chain, and processing and manufacturing of goods are still an 
important part of its industrial activity (Yue and Evenett 2010). China is certainly not a world 
leader in high-tech industries. While it has increased the amount of technological products as 
a share of total exports, and one classification label almost one-third of China´s exports 
“high-tech” as of 2005, these exports still to a large extent revolve around the assembly of 
imported components or parts produced with the help of foreign technologies. One example 
is Apple products, which are made in China, but where most of the revenue goes to an 
American company. Apple provides the technology, design and marketing, while the labor-
intensive assembling of the phone is done in China (Koopman, Wang, and Wei 2008: 1). 
Kraemer, Linden, and Dedrick (2011) estimate that China captures around USD 10 from 
producing an iPad, iPhone, or iPod, products that retail for hundreds of dollars. The imported 
content used in production has become more advanced, but the Chinese production 
	  87	  
techniques have not seen a similar development and have not necessarily become more skill-
intensive (Amiti and Freund 2007; Yusuf and Nabeshima 2007). Some of its main areas of 
expansion in the 1980s- and 1990s were low-tech and labor-intensive industries with minimal 
spillovers to technological development. Even the high-tech products it has been exporting, 
such as laptops, has contributed little to the development of domestic production capabilities 
(Naughton 2007). 
 
With the increase in exports of consumer electronics and computers, it can initially seem like 
China has gone through a process of upgrading its natural factor endowment structure and 
created comparative advantages in new industries. However, much of the growth in 
electronics and similar industries has been through an increase in processing and assembling 
(Zhang et al. 2009). While the products exported might be higher up the value chain, that 
does not mean the products China exports today are that much more skill intensive. Statistics 
can be misleading, because a country can produce simple products that are labeled “high-
tech”. Electronics and communication equipment is considered high-tech, but a low-tech 
product like calculators is included in this category (Vaidya et al. 2007: 1004). 
 
Rising costs and increased industrial capacity both in China and in the world is reducing the 
profit margins in China´s existing industries; profit margins that have been relatively low in 
the first place, as much of China´s exports traditionally have consisted of simple and cheap 
products without much domestic technological input. Revenues have been further squeezed 
in later years as the RMB has appreciated and wages has increased along with China´s overall 
economic growth. Furthermore, competition from other low-wage countries in the Greater 
Mekong region coupled with rising wages in China has removed much of China´s advantage 
in producing goods cheaply. The rising costs of production in China´s coastal areas have 
affected firms producing labor-intensive goods. For example, in 2007 15 % of shoe 
manufacturers in the city of Dongguan closed or relocated to other regions in China or other 
Asian countries (Yue and Evenett 2010: 14). To some extent, the high production costs can 
be countered by the infrastructure offered in China, the skilled labor force, and the experience 
it has in manufacturing, elements that might be less evident in other countries with lower 
wages. China´s huge internal market might also make it attractive to keep production in the 
country despite rising costs. Relying on simple, cheap, and labor-intensive manufacturing in 
the future to the same extent that it has in the past is probably not a viable strategy (Yue and 
Evenett 2010). 
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With the traditional comparative advantages of China gradually shifting, along with greater 
experiences in new industries and better technological capabilities, China has to put in 
serious efforts at continued industrial upgrading in order to be able to compete and maximize 
revenues in the future. It has been increasingly important for China to move up the value 
chain and lessen its dependency on the assembling of foreign, high-tech products. This can be 
achieved if China manages to continue to strengthen and increase its technological 
capabilities (Wong 2012; Yusuf and Nabeshima 2007). 
 
7.3 Industrial Upgrading Through Following or Defying 
Comparative Advantages? 
While China´s industrial structure is still lagging behind that of more developed nations, its 
industrial composition and exporting industries have been rapidly developing. An interesting 
point in this regard is whether China´s process of industrial upgrading most resembles a CAD 
or a CAF strategy. 
 
The positions of Lin and Chang, and the CAF versus the CAD development strategy, have 
been thoroughly explained in earlier parts of this thesis. I find it harder to analyze the 
industrial developments of China than that of other East Asian countries such as Japan, 
Taiwan, and South Korea. This is natural as these other countries have been developing for a 
longer time, and are more developed and transparent as of today. We would surely be able to 
say more about China´s developments as well in ten or twenty years from now. There are 
more clear-cut examples of the government successfully picking winners in South Korea than 
in China. One industry with a similar development in both China and South Korea is the auto 
industry, which has been actively protected and promoted by both governments, although the 
earlier established South Korean auto industry is more developed and successful than its 
Chinese counterpart. 
 
7.3.1 Arguments Supporting Industrial Upgrading Through a CAD 
Strategy in China 
A CAD strategy is essentially about strategically defying one´s comparative advantages. Due 
to a developing country´s factor endowment structure, private firms cannot compete in open, 
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free markets, and thus has to be protected by the government until they are able to. This will 
allow it to move up the value chain and upgrade its industrial structure. A central point of 
Chang is that a developing country cannot wait until its factor endowment structure has been 
upgraded “naturally”; instead it has to deliberately violate its comparative advantages and 
enter more advanced industries before the factor endowment structure has been altered. In 
this section, I lay out arguments showing how elements of a CAD strategy have been 
prevalent in the development of China´s industrial structure. 
   
China´s Export Bundle is Similar to That of a Country With a Higher GDP 
As noted earlier, Rodrik (2006) finds that China´s exports are skewed towards high 
productivity goods. In 1992, its exports were similar to that of countries with a GDP per 
capita more than six times that of China. Although this number has decreased since then, 
China´s exports are still higher than what it should be, based on its per capita GDP. A country 
like Bangladesh, for example, has a factor endowment structure similar to China, but still an 
export basket with a level of productivity around 50 % less. This is an important observation 
because there is a correlation between a country´s level of productivity in its exports and its 
level of economic growth. Had China exported only those products it could be expected to 
export based on its income level, its economic growth could have been less significant. 
Exporting high productivity goods is beneficial for economic growth because when some 
investors engage in high-productivity export activities, others are attracted to the same 
sectors, causing a transfer of resources from lower to higher production activities (Rodrik 
2006). 
 
The fact that China managed to not only produce such advanced goods, but also export them, 
with a backward factor endowment structure, presents issues for scholars such as Lin. He 
would claim that China has managed to upgrade its industrial structure because rational firms 
entered industries where they had a comparative advantage. China´s comparatively 
sophisticated exports relative to its GDP resemble the developments of Japan and South 
Korea. Japan were promoting capital-intensive and relative sophisticated industries like car 
and steel production, and shipbuilding, when its GDP per capita was only 19 % of that of the 
U.S. South Korea promoted many of the same industries when its GDP per capita was only 
5.5 % of U.S. GDP per capita (Lin and Chang 2009: 497). 
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FDI and Foreign Firms Attracted by the Government Contributed to Industrial 
Development 
FDI and the presence of foreign firms have contributed to China´s industrial development. 
They have exposed China to more advanced technology and better managerial skills, and 
provided much-needed capital. As it has been pointed to earlier in this thesis, the activities 
undertaken by foreign firms in developing countries is often labor-intensive and low-skilled 
manufacturing, so one should not overstate the technological spillovers to China. Still, the 
presence of foreign actors benefited China and helped develop its market and its increasingly 
capitalist economy. 
 
Their presence was made possible by the efforts of the government. If the central government 
had not allowed FDI inflows and the creation of the SEZs, China´s exposure to foreign inputs 
would have been less. The government also facilitated the activities of foreign firms in the 
SEZs through developing a legal system, simplifying bureaucratic procedures, creating 
incentives, giving them freedom in how they operated, and so on. The deliberate government 
interventions in the economy, creating the necessary conditions for foreign investments, 
indirectly contributed to the development of China´s industrial structure. Without the 
government, private actors would probably have had less interaction with foreign firms, and 
fewer possibilities to develop the skills needed to move into more advanced industries. There 
is empirical evidence that FDI has contributed to filling technological gaps in China, through 
the introduction of more advanced technology. Increasing competition between firms has also 
led to an upgrade of China´s technological level, and favorable R&D policies to foreign firms 
might have increased the amount of research they have undertaken. The use of local suppliers 
by foreign companies has caused technological spillovers because foreign firms often impose 
specific requirements on local producers (Long 2005). 
 
China Protected its Electronics Industry 
Chang criticizes the notion of perfect factor mobility that is assumed in the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson take on the theory of comparative advantage. He does not agree with the idea that 
resources can be freely moved from one industry to another. The fact that the Chinese textile 
industry was successful, for example, does not mean that the capital and skills accumulated in 
this industry could be used to upgrade China´s factor endowment structure and create 
comparative advantages in a capital-intensive industry like electronics (Lin and Chang 2009). 
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Chang argues that the governments of developing countries have to protect the firms in the 
industries in which they do not have a comparative advantage. A country cannot simply 
“wait” with entering a new industry before it has altered its factor endowment structure. 
Being able to compete internationally requires learning and is something new firms have to 
go through. According to a CAD strategy, this is why the government of developing 
countries will have to protect infant-industries and strategically violate the theory of 
comparative advantage, entering new industries before the factor endowment structure has 
been altered (Lin and Chang 2009). 
 
According to the logic of a CAF strategy, China´s success in light manufacturing should have 
contributed to upgrading its factor endowment structure and made it possible for new firms to 
enter more capital-intensive industries like the electronics sector. However, this is not what 
happened. The electronics industry in China, which has become increasingly successful with 
international giants such as Huawei and ZTE, was heavily subsidized and protected by the 
Chinese government for years. China became the world´s biggest exporter of electronics in 
2004, and the second largest producer in 2005 (Zhao, Huang, Ye, and Gentle 2007: 33). This 
industry benefited greatly from FDI and transfer of technology, but not only private 
enterprises facilitated the growth of this industry. Making the electronics industry a priority 
industry, and establishing such offices as the Ministry of Electronics Industry and the 
Ministry of Information Industry, as well as plans like the Strategy of Promoting Trade by 
Relying on High-tech of 1999, contributed to its growth. The government protected and 
assisted it through for example establishing technical standards, banning imports of certain 
components, and regulating access to the domestic market (Zhao et al. 2007). 
 
The development of the heavily supported and protected electronics industry is an argument 
illustrating elements of a CAD strategy in China. In the view of Chang, firms cannot 
necessarily enter new and more capital-intensive industries due to the lack of perfect factor 
mobility. Even if the factor endowment structure of a country is altered, resources cannot 
readily be transferred from one industry to another. Therefore, government protection might 
be needed even if the necessary factor endowments are in place, and firms in theory should 
be able to enter more advanced industries.  
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7.3.2 Arguments Supporting Industrial Upgrading Through a CAF 
Strategy in China 
As opposed to Chang, Lin claims that the best strategy to alter the factor endowment 
structure and achieve industrial upgrading is by entering those industries where one has a 
comparative advantage. This will upgrade the factor endowment structure and allow profit-
maximizing firms to enter more advanced industries and continue to upgrade the industrial 
structure. Hence, an important point is that a country has to utilize the comparative 
advantages of today, and not the advantages it might have in the future. In this section I show 
how also elements of a CAF strategy have been evident in China´s industrial development. 
 
China Followed its Comparative Advantages to a Certain Extent 
Lin (2007) claims that a country´s factor endowment structure has the biggest influence on 
the technology and industries it chooses to develop. The factor endowment structure might be 
altered, and is defining in which industries a country has a comparative advantage at a given 
point in time. According to Lin, a country following its comparative advantages will be the 
most competitive, produce the largest surplus, accumulate the largest amount of capital, and 
upgrade its endowment structure the fastest.  
 
China´s industrial focus moved from the capital-intensive industries it had operated in under 
Mao, and into light and labor-intensive manufacturing after the economic reforms. This was 
in accordance with its given factor endowment structure and comparative advantage, which 
was in labor-intensive manufacturing activities (Lin and Chang 2009). As much of the 
emerging industries were competitive, the Chinese export sector thrived and became 
successful. The firms were viable, and China did not attempt to develop excessively capital-
intensive industries, something many governments in developing countries have (Lin 2007). 
It can be argued that China did follow its comparative advantages and a CAF strategy to a 
large extent. China could draw on already developed technology from more advanced 
countries, and this was important to the economic growth of both China and other East Asian 
economies (Lin and Chang 2009). 
 
Lardy (1992) argues that China´s increased export activities has been the result of its ability 
to realize its comparative advantages. Labor-intensive products have made up an increasingly 
bigger share of total exports, and the importance of primary exports has simultaneously 
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declined. Private firms and the market have contributed to this shift, which is in accordance 
with a CAF strategy, where profit-maximizing actors enter those industries where they have a 
comparative advantage. 
 
The Government Promoted R&D, Innovation, and Technological and Infrastructural 
Development 
The government has taken measures to improve China´s capabilities in innovation and 
technological development. The full-time equivalent of R&D personnel went from 0.75 
million in 1995 to 196.5 million in 2008, and R&D expenditure as a share of total GDP rose 
from 0.5 % to 1.54 % (Wong 2012: 141; Zhang et al. 2009). R&D figures are only one way 
to consider the efforts at industrial upgrading; between 1978-2002, USD 225.7 billion was 
spent on importing technology. However, as China increasingly has sought to develop its 
capacity in innovation, and decrease its reliance on technology imports, spending has been 
shifting from imports to R&D (Zhang et al. 2009: 6). The substantial investments China has 
made in R&D, and incentives such as tax breaks, preferential procurement, and subsidized 
credit from the government, has probably been an important factor why China has managed 
to climb the technological ladder. 
 
The central and local governments have also assisted in developing infrastructure and various 
institutions. Market failures in developing countries can lead to information externalities and 
co-ordination problems, and it is uncertain whether private firms on their own could have 
developed the vital infrastructure and institutions necessary for economic growth and 
industrial upgrading. Economic innovations provide information on the profitability of 
market opportunities. This information is freely available not only to the firm undertaking the 
innovation, but also competing firms. The benefits of innovation do not necessarily reflect the 
costs of being the first firm to enter a new industry or to take advantage of new technology. 
Government subsidies can help offset this. A developing country needs to upgrade its 
infrastructure and institutions. As individual firms cannot undertake such responsibilities in a 
cost-effective manner, the government can assist in this development, or co-ordinate the 
activities of many different firms (Lin and Chang 2009). 
 
The role of government in promoting R&D, innovation and the development of infrastructure 
might at first seem like an argument why China´s industrial upgrading has resembled a CAD 
strategy. However, government interventions undertaken to develop the market and the 
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institutions needed for economic growth is something Lin supports. The efforts undertaken 
by central and local authorities in order to correct market failures are one element of the 
Chinese developmental strategy that is in line with what a CAF strategy prescribes. 
 
7.4 Two Industries With Elements of a CAF and a CAD 
Strategy 
The two industries below are included to exemplify how elements of both a CAD and a CAF 
strategy have been evident in China´s industrial development. 
 
7.4.1 The Auto Industry – Defying Comparative Advantages 
China produced only 220,000 motor vehicles and 5,400 cars in 1980. In 2006, this number 
had risen to 7.3 million vehicles and 3.9 million cars. Its share of global motor vehicle output 
grew from 0.4 % in 1978 to 12.2 % in 2007 (Zhang et al. 2009: 7-8). One can certainly 
question whether China did in fact have the necessary endowment structure, the capital 
resources, and the technological capabilities needed to warrant an entry into a relatively 
capital-intensive industry like auto manufacturing. The auto industry was designated as a 
pillar industry by the government at an early stage of the economic reforms. While China did 
produce a limited amount of cars - mainly trucks - at the time, it was clear that this was an 
industry the government wanted to develop. In 1984, Premier Zhao expressed the desire for 
upgrading the auto industry to world standards by 1990 (Yueh 2011). 
 
A government´s desire to develop an industry does not necessarily imply that a CAD strategy 
is pursued, as the government can attempt to develop an industry through giving incentives to 
private firms and limit its interventions in the industry. Still, I would argue that the way the 
Chinese government supported the auto industry has strong features of a CAD strategy. Its 
development was pursued through relying on FDI and establishing JVs, something that 
positively influenced it (McKinsey Global Institute 2003; Yueh 2011). 
 
Establishing JVs in the Auto Industry 
In 1984, the first major manufacturing Chinese-foreign JV after the Cultural Revolution was 
established in the auto industry. The vast potential of China´s domestic market was a strong 
attractor of FDI (Gallagher 2006; McKinsey Global Institute 2003). After some disagreement 
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inside the government over the future strategy for the Chinese auto industry, an industrial 
policy was created in 1994. The numerous different auto manufacturers was to be 
consolidated into a few major players, Chinese manufacturers were protected from foreign 
competition, JVs were required to used at least 40 % locally produced content, and the 
private ownership of cars was encouraged in order to increase demand (Gallagher 2006). 
Prior to this policy, the foreign part of a JV was free to choose what technologies to transfer, 
and how it would do so. The later local content requirement forced the foreign firms to work 
with domestic producers and improve the quality of their output (Yueh 2011). However, the 
cooperation between the Chinese and foreign firms did not turn out to be as successful as the 
Chinese government had hoped. The amount of foreign know-how that had been gained was 
limited, and few passenger cars were produced by the 1990s, despite the governments desire 
to do so (Gallagher 2006). In 2004, the Chinese government reaffirmed its support for the 
integration of foreign technologies into domestic production, and continued to encourage 
industrial restructuring that would create large conglomerates. Further R&D was also 
supported, in order to lay the foundation for continued technological upgrading and capacity 
building (Yueh 2011).  
 
There were over 130 auto manufacturers in China in 2004, and this number had supposedly 
risen to 150 in 2007, despite the government´s efforts at consolidating and restructuring the 
industry and reducing its amount of firms. In 1986, three companies were singled out to 
become the major players of the industry. These three accounted for 67 % of the sedan 
market as of 2002, and the year after they produced 1.38 million sedans combined. Each of 
them formed JVs with foreign partners, and had a market share of 48.7 % in 2008. Also 
domestic manufacturers without foreign linkages have emerged, capturing a 30 % market 
share in 2009 (Yueh 2011). 
 
The automobile industry is an example of the Chinese government´s desire to upgrade its 
industrial structure and develop more advanced industries than what it already had at the start 
of the Open Door policy. After a slow start, the industry picked up the pace and in the 1990s 
it contributed a lot to the Chinese economic growth. In the more recent years it has continued 
to grow and established itself as a solid industry capable of creating growth (Gallagher 2006). 
During the development of this industry, the government protected it through high tariffs on 
imports, local content requirements, foreign equity limits, and government-controlled 
distribution. After China joined the WTO in 2001, the industry was liberalized. The local 
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content requirement was removed and tariffs were reduced (McKinsey Global Institute 2003; 
Yueh 2011). 
 
Did Entering the Auto Industry Violate China´s Comparative Advantages? 
The Chinese auto industry has undoubtedly developed significantly after the government first 
singled it out as a pillar industry it would support. Production has greatly increased and China 
is also exporting more cars abroad. It has benefited greatly from being designated a pillar 
industry, and the establishment of JVs and local content requirements have helped domestic 
manufacturers increase their skills and technological capabilities. Based on China´s factor 
endowment structure when the auto industry started to develop, it is clear that it did not have 
a comparative advantage in car manufacturing. From a CAF perspective, it lacked the 
necessary skills and capital that would make it rational for private firms to enter the industry. 
 
A proponent of a CAF strategy could claim that the Chinese auto industry could have been 
developed without extensive government support, and that private actors would have entered 
such a relatively advanced and capital-intensive industry when the timing was right (i.e. when 
the factor endowment structure had been sufficiently upgraded). However, China would 
likely not have accumulated the sufficient capital resources enabling private firms to enter the 
industry until several years after it actually started to develop. This would have delayed the 
process of gaining experience, developing and importing technologies, and building capacity, 
and the result could have been a less competitive auto industry today. China would also have 
lost out on the positive effects the developing auto industry has provided over the last 
decades, such as increased employment, higher wages, lower prices, higher quality and a 
bigger variety of cars, and tax revenues (McKinsey Global Institute 2003).  
 
A lack of local content requirements could have hurt domestic suppliers. With this law, the 
foreign part of JVs was forced to assist the development of domestic producers. In addition, 
without government support, the auto manufacturers would perhaps never have been able to 
compete with foreign firms, or it would take a substantial amount of time before they could. 
While the Chinese auto industry is still developing, and less advanced than in other countries, 
I would still claim that China successfully managed to defy its comparative advantages when 
it first started to develop its auto industry. The result has been a relatively successful industry 
it otherwise might not have had. 
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7.4.2 The Clothing and Textile Industry – Following Comparative 
Advantages 
While China can be said to have defied its comparative advantages when entering the auto 
industry, the development of the clothing and textile industry has been more in line with a 
CAF strategy, although the government also intervened in this industry. 
 
China was originally a major exporter of textiles in 1950, but the heavy-industry 
development strategy pursued under Mao caused it to lose much of its previous market share. 
In 1970, its global clothing market share was less than 5 %. When China opened its economy, 
it once again focused on the textile industry. China´s enormous and low-paid labor force at 
the time presented a significant comparative advantage in simple, labor-intensive industries. 
Despite the natural comparative advantage, the industry was still promoted through the “Six 
Priorities”-policy. Preferential policies resulted in a high annual growth rate for the textile 
and clothing industries. When export-oriented development later was pursued, the textile 
industry was again prioritized. In 1995, China became the world´s biggest exporter of textile 
and garments, and in 2002 it captured an impressive 18 % share of the world market (Yueh 
2011). 
 
After the promotion of capital-intensive industries, China´s trade pattern started to adjust to 
its comparative advantage after the economic reforms. While the textile industry was 
dominated by SOEs in the beginning, private actors like TVEs gradually became more 
important (Yueh 2011). In many respects, entering the labor-intensive textile industry was in 
line with a CAF strategy. This industry reflected China´s given factor endowment structure at 
the time, and by succeeding in this industry, China could accumulate capital and upgrade its 
factor endowment structure, enabling firms to move into more advanced and capital-intensive 
industries. However, the substantial amount of government protection given to manufacturers 
in the textile industry is not in line with a CAF strategy, where excessive government support 
should not be necessary. However, textile producers could very well have been successful 
even without the government´s support and favorable conditions. Also the fact that TVEs - 
which likely received less support than the SOEs - did very well in the textile industry shows 
that following its comparative advantage has been the right strategy for China, at least in 
some industries. Furthermore, it has illustrated that firms can prosper without government 
protection and support. 
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The Chinese economy has a history of vast government control and interventions by the state. 
Thus, finding a clear-cut example illustrating elements of a CAF strategy in China´s 
industrial development is probably not possible. While the textile industry received much 
government support and protection, it is still one empirical example illustrating how also 
elements of a CAF strategy have been evident in China´s industrial upgrading.  
 
7.5 Shenzhen´s Industrial Development 
After the Shenzhen SEZ was set up as one of the initial four SEZs in the early 1980s, it has 
been transformed from a small fishing village to a high-tech hub with a drastically altered 
industrial structure. It performs as well as a medium-sized Chinese province, its economic 
output is the fourth highest among major Chinese cities, and its GDP per capita and its 
international trade as a share of GDP is the highest in the nation (Yuan et al. 2010). 
 
7.5.1 The Developments of the Shenzhen SEZ 
Like in the other SEZs, the Shenzhen SEZ had much focus on attracting FDI. Shenzhen 
managed to create big inflows of FDI and represented a substantial part of the total FDI to 
China´s open areas. The proximity to Hong Kong was highly beneficial as it was a major 
source of FDI to both Shenzhen and other SEZs. Low transportation costs and a common 
language and culture made it attractive for investors to place their money in Shenzhen. 
Agricultural reforms released surplus labor and supplied foreign companies with low-paid 
workers, and economic incentives were given to foreign investors (Wei 2000). Shenzhen has 
gradually increased the scale of its industry and increasingly produced more technologically 
sophisticated products. The industrial growth of Shenzhen has been the most important factor 
in the development of its economy and growth of its GDP (Yuan et al. 2010). As early as 
1998, high-tech industries accounted for around 40 % of Shenzhen´s industrial output (Wei 
2000). 
 
The lack of developed infrastructure and institutional, legal, administrative, and financial 
frameworks in the early years of the zone was one of the reasons why a vast majority of its 
incoming FDI went to such areas as tourism and real estate development instead of 
manufacturing. After investing in infrastructure, assisted by contributions from foreign 
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investors, and improving legal and bureaucratic structures, FDI to manufacturing industries 
started to increase around 1982 (Wei 2000). 
 
As Shenzhen continued to develop, the cost of land and labor rose drastically. Other, less 
developed areas of China were becoming more attractive to many foreign companies 
operating in labor-intensive industries. Due to the increased competition from inland China, 
as well as the realization that technological capabilities were important in order to continue 
the process of industrialization, the local government increasingly focused on building up 
technology-intensive industries. Shenzhen initially expanded through processing and 
assembly activities, as well as trade, but increasingly promoted the development of high-tech 
industries (Yuan et al. 2010). In order to attract better technologies, the economic incentives 
in the zone were further increased to those firms operating in more high-tech industries. The 
Shenzhen government also increased its efforts at R&D and at protecting intellectual property 
(Wei 2000; Zeng 2011). The industrial structure of the Shenzhen SEZ has evolved 
continuously since it was first established, and the production activities going on in the zone 
today are much more technologically advanced and capital-intensive than 30 to 40 years ago. 
The industrial sector has been the driving force of Shenzhen´s economy. In 1979, the 
contribution of the industrial sector in the GDP growth was only 11.8 %. In 1994 it had risen 
to 43 %, and after that it has never been lower than 40 % (Yuan et al. 2010: 59). 
 
The government of Shenzhen has managed to promote industries using more advanced 
technologies. The total gross output value of high-tech industries increased from USD 0.34 
billion 1991 to USD 111.42 billion in 2007. The exports of high-tech products and patent 
applications have also been rapidly increasing, illustrating a shift from importing to 
developing technology. Both in value-added and in its contribution to GDP, Shenzhen´s high-
tech industry ranks higher than other major Chinese cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin 
(Yuan et al. 2010: 62). 
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Figure 7: GDP Share of Shenzhen´s Three Main Industrial Sectors as % of Total. 1979-2010. 
 
 
 
Source: Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2011: 10, table 1-4. 
 
As seen in figure 7 above, the industrial composition of Shenzhen has been drastically altered 
after 1979. The three main sectors of the industry had a relatively equal share of the GDP at 
the start of the SEZ experiment, with 37 %, 20.5 %, and 42.5 % each for the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary industry. As the figure illustrates, the primary sector was virtually 
non-existent in Shenzhen´s industry as of 2010. The secondary industry has more than 
doubled to a share of 47.2 %, whereas the tertiary industry has grown to 52.7 % (Shenzhen 
Statistical Yearbook 2011: 10, table 1-4). In China as a whole, the primary industry 
accounted for a share of 10.1 % of GDP, the secondary industry 46.8 %, while the tertiary 
industry represented 40.1 % (China Statistical Yearbook 2011: 45, table 2-2). The fact that 
Shenzhen has eliminated the primary industry from its economy, while it still remains 
significant in China, suggests that the industrial upgrading has been more successful in the 
Shenzhen SEZ than in China. The tertiary sector, however, is one sector China has managed 
to increase, something Shenzhen has not. This is probably because the actual share of this 
sector was much higher in Shenzhen than in China in the late 1970s, and as such the potential 
for growth was not as big. Also, looking at the actual size of the tertiary sector, and not its 
developmental pattern, it is clear that it was bigger in Shenzhen than in China in 2005. 
 
The massive growth of the more capital-intensive and advanced secondary and tertiary 
sectors of Shenzhen´s industry is illustrative of an industrial structure that has been rapidly 
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changing. The less advanced agricultural sector represented 64.8 % of agricultural-industrial 
output in 1979, but it soon started to decline and was virtually non-existent in 2010. 
 
As a share of industrial output, light industry initially accounted for 88.5 % compared to 11.5 
% for heavy industry. Light industry was far bigger than heavy industry around the time the 
Shenzhen SEZ was created, and remained bigger until 2000, when heavy industry 
represented the largest share with 55.3 %. As of 2010, the industrial structure of 1979 was 
turned upside down when heavy industry had far outgrown light industry and accounted for 
75.2 % of total industrial output (Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2011: 6, table 1-3. My 
calculations). 
 
Both light and heavy industry are more advanced sectors of the economy than agriculture, 
and Shenzhen´s agricultural sector is almost non-existent as of today. It is complicated to 
draw clear conclusions on the altered shares of light and heavy industrial output, because they 
comprise both capital- and labor-intensive industries. However, heavy industries might 
generally be defined as more capital- and knowledge-intensive than light industries 
(Businessdictionary.com n.d.). Both the declining agricultural sector, and the increased share 
of heavy industry, can point to an industrial upgrading in Shenzhen. 
 
Shenzhen´s Industrial Structure Has Been Upgraded 
I have argued that China´s industry has been upgraded and become more technologically 
advanced, although issues such as a large product assembly industry and limited spillover 
effects from the high-tech industries persist. One can argue that Shenzhen has been more 
successful in upgrading its industrial structure, but differing goals makes it hard to directly 
compare China and Shenzhen. The SEZs functioned as laboratories and were frontrunners in 
the Chinese economic growth, and the focus on industrial upgrading has been bigger in the 
SEZs. They also used vast economic incentives to attract foreign, high-tech companies, 
something the areas outside them did not do, at least not in the early years of reform. 
 
Shenzhen has become a high-tech hub of China. Already in 1998, it had a large share of the 
domestic market of various relatively high-tech products, and also a substantial share of the 
world market for some products. Of the domestic market, the market share of Shenzhen SEZ 
in floppy disks, motherboards, monitors, and LCD screens were all above 70 %, and it also 
represented a large part of the market for other products as well. Of the world market, the 
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Shenzhen SEZ had a 14 % share of floppy disks, 23 % of watches and clocks, and 10 % of 
magnetic heads (Wei 2000: 202). These products are not the most advanced, but they are still 
relatively sophisticated, and these numbers are from 1998 when Shenzhen was less advanced 
than it is today. Shenzhen has increasingly exported more high-tech products. In 2001, it 
exported high-tech products worth USD 11.37 billion, and in 2010 this number had increased 
to USD 108.73 billion (Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2011: 333, table 15-2). Shenzhen 
ranked first in China in 2008 in registering new patents (Yeung et al. 2009). The total number 
of patent applications increased from only 261 in 1991 to 49,430 in 2010 (Shenzhen 
Statistical Yearbook 2011: 334, table 15-3). When the 11th FYP was launched in 2006, 
Shenzhen´s economy was described as being made up of four main elements: high-tech 
industrialization, logistics, finance, and culture industries such as tourism and entertainment 
(Huang 2008, as referenced in Yeung et al. 2009). 
 
7.5.2 The Shenzhen SEZ: Following or Defying Comparative Advantages? 
Naturally, the way Shenzhen developed was not entirely different from the way the rest of 
China did. The entire SEZ experiment was something set up and led by the central 
government, and it was the leadership at the time that made it possible for Shenzhen to grow 
and develop as much as it did. Local authorities facilitated much of the industrial 
development of Shenzhen, and as such the roles of central and local governments were 
important. However, private actors and the market did also play vital roles. Rational foreign 
investors placed their capital in the zone and utilized its comparative advantages. FDI inflows 
were necessary to Shenzhen´s development.  
 
The vast incentives given to foreign investors in the Chinese SEZs have been outlined. While 
these might have contributed in attracting FDI, some authors argue that China´s cheap labor 
and huge domestic market perhaps was even more important. Probably more vital than the 
economic incentives was the government´s efforts at developing infrastructure, a legal 
framework, reducing bureaucratic procedures, and giving confidence to foreign investors 
unfamiliar with and unsure about the Chinese market. 
 
In the early stage of the Shenzhen SEZ´s development, most of the FDI it received went to 
tourism and real estate development. This required fewer investments, and its inadequate 
infrastructure and institutional framework at the time did not contribute in attracting FDI to 
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the manufacturing sector. As these conditions improved, FDI to the manufacturing industry 
started to increase. In the 1980s, the key industries of Shenzhen were light, labor-intensive 
manufacturing. Firms became successful and upgraded their technological skills, and capital 
became relatively more abundant. The factor endowment structure of Shenzhen was 
gradually upgraded (Wei 2000). 
 
As Shenzhen became more developed, it started to lose its comparative advantage in cheap 
labor and land to less developed areas of China. The local government focused on attracting 
more advanced technology and promoting technology-intensive industries. Shenzhen could 
provide a developed infrastructure and labor that was better educated than elsewhere in 
China, but still relatively low-paid. Its comparative advantage shifted into more technology- 
and capital-intensive industries, and it managed to develop more high-tech industries than 
other areas of the country (Wei 2000). The way Shenzhen´s industrial structure has been 
upgraded is quite in line with a CAF strategy promoted by Lin. Local authorities did not 
pursue the development of capital-intensive industries that defied Shenzhen´s comparative 
advantages, but instead its industrial structure was upgraded in accordance with its natural 
factor endowments, and the industrial structure gradually became more advanced as 
technological capabilities and the abundance of capital increased. 
 
Shenzhen did not have a completely free market with a limited government, and is not a 
perfect example of development through a CAF strategy. The government for example 
provided incentives to foreign investors both in Shenzhen and the other SEZs. The Shenzhen 
SEZ gave additional incentives to high-tech manufacturers that perhaps were even more 
substantial than in the other zones. Still, its developmental process has many elements of a 
CAF strategy, and especially so compared to other Chinese cities. As opposed to China in 
general, private, foreign corporations were more involved in its industrial activities than 
SOEs, and the way the industrial structure was upgraded is partly a result of the rational 
actions of private firms. Attempts at strategically defying comparative advantages through 
industrial development were not made, as it was elsewhere in China. The role of the local 
government was mainly confined to developing Shenzhen´s missing market, and developing 
infrastructure and institutional frameworks. The government is encouraged to perform such 
roles under a CAF strategy. 
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7.6 Chapter Summary 
At the start of this chapter, I presented the following set of thesis questions: 
 
o Has China successfully managed to upgrade its industrial structure after 1978? 
o Have the attempts at upgrading it been in line with a comparative-advantage-
following or a comparative-advantage-defying strategy? 
 
China after the economic reforms had to drastically alter the way it pursued industrial 
development. Capital-intensive, heavy industries had been promoted under Mao, and the 
previously neglected light industries had to be developed. Light and labor-intensive industries 
were growing in the 1980s and 90s, and China eventually produced more and more 
sophisticated products such as machinery, electronics, and telecommunication equipment. 
After the economic reforms, China´s primary industry has greatly declined, while the tertiary 
industry has increased. The secondary industry has remained quite unchanged.   
 
The initial expansion of exports was government-led and consisted of products such as oil 
and petroleum. Eventually, also in the export sector did light industrial products and textiles 
become increasingly important, and most of China´s exports after around 1990 have been 
manufactured goods. As China´s export bundle has become more sophisticated, the share of 
labor-intensive and simple products has declined while products such as machinery and 
transport equipment have been exported to a bigger extent. Some have argued that China´s 
export bundle are more advanced than what it should be from looking at its level of GDP, and 
that the view of China as “the world´s factory” no longer is correct. 
 
There is sufficient empirical evidence to conclude that China´s industrial structure has been 
upgraded. China produces much more advanced products now than what it did at the start of 
the economic reforms, it exports more sophisticated products, and to a bigger extent than 
before uses domestically produced rather than imported components. Its comparative 
advantages has been shifting to more advanced industries, and manufacturing value added 
has increased. At the same time, China´s industrial structure is less developed than that of 
more advanced countries. Much of its manufactured goods are still at the lower end of the 
value chain, and the processing of goods remains important. Many exported products labeled 
“high-tech” are still dependent on imported and foreign-produced components. While the 
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products are higher up the value chain, they are not necessarily that much more skill 
intensive. These products also provide few spillovers to the domestic industries. China will 
have to continue to upgrade its industrial structure and keep developing its high-tech 
industries, as rising wages has caused it to gradually lose its comparative advantage in cheap 
labor. Other countries are more suited for labor-intensive production today and will continue 
to take such activity away from China in the future. 
 
China´s process of industrial upgrading seems too multi-faceted to claim that it strictly 
resembles either a CAF or a CAD strategy. The Chinese government is strong and has 
intervened in many aspects of the economy, and was important in attracting FDI and foreign 
firms that contributed to its economic growth. It protected its electronics and auto industries, 
and China´s exports have been more advanced than it “should” have been, according to its 
factor endowment structure. These elements are in line with a CAD strategy. At the same 
time, China did follow its comparative advantages to a certain extent. After promoting 
capital-intensive heavy industries under Mao, industrial activity shifted to labor-intensive 
industries in accordance with Chinas factor endowment structure. The government facilitated 
R&D, the development of infrastructure and technology, and pursued innovation, something 
that is in line with a CAF strategy. While the clothing and textile industries did receive 
government support and protection, entering these industries was also largely in accordance 
with its factor endowment structure. Private firms succeeded because they had a comparative 
advantage in these industries, and especially TVEs did very well. Such enterprises did 
probably receive less government support than the SOEs, and can be said to have developed 
in accordance with a CAF strategy. 
 
Generally, China´s process of industrial upgrading features both elements of a CAF and a 
CAD strategy. However, it was perhaps somewhat more in line with the latter, because of its 
interventionist government and that comparative advantages did not act as the guideline for 
development, something proponents of a CAF strategy claim they should. 
 
In the last part of the chapter, I briefly evaluated the industrial developments of the Shenzhen 
SEZ. It has been the most successful of the initial zones, and has a more advanced industrial 
structure than China overall. Its primary sector is almost non-existent, and it has become the 
country´s high-tech hub. Its economic development is now driven by advanced economic 
sectors such as high-tech, finance, and logistics. Shenzhen´s industrial development has been 
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more clearly in line with a CAF strategy than in China overall. It had a less interventionist 
government, allowed private firms and comparative advantages to guide the growth of its 
economy, and focused on developing increasingly advanced industries as its economy grew 
and its factor endowment structure was altered.  
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8 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
This thesis is a study of China´s economic development and the use of SEZs in its economic 
growth process, its attempts at industrial upgrading, and whether this process has been in line 
with a CAD or a CAF strategy. These are multi-faceted and complicated topics, and I have 
tried to answer the thesis questions I presented in a satisfying manner. I have provided a 
theoretical framework functioning as a foundation for the thesis, as well as outlining the 
historical developments needed in order to understand the topics of the thesis and the 
discussion related to them. 
 
The thesis questions have been answered in detail in each of the two analytical chapters, so I 
will only briefly present the main findings of this thesis. 
 
After a failed developmental strategy under Mao, Deng came to power and launched 
extensive economic reforms in the late 1970s. China´s development strategy under Deng was 
characterized by pragmatism and a willingness to let capitalism and the free market play a 
role in the country´s future. SEZs were used as tools for economic development. They 
functioned as laboratories where new policies could first be tested out, and opened China up 
to the world. They had considerable autonomy in their operations, and power was for the first 
time decentralized. The SEZs were successful tools for achieving economic growth, and 
contributed to attract FDI, expose China to foreign technology, create spillover effects, 
develop China´s coastal areas, increase exports, and upgrade its technological capabilities. 
The Shenzhen SEZ was the most successful of the initial zones, partly due to its location next 
to Hong Kong and its willingness to experiment with new policies not seen in the other 
zones. China under Deng would probably have managed to create economic growth even 
without the SEZs, and China´s vast, low-paid labor force and huge domestic market would 
likely have attracted foreign investors and economic activity regardless. However, I believe 
China´s economic growth would have been slower and less impressive without the SEZs. 
 
China has managed to upgrade its industrial structure after its economic reforms. It has 
increasingly exported more advanced products, and its domestic industry is more 
sophisticated today than previously. That being said, it is still lagging behind more developed 
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countries. Processing trade remains important and China continues to rely on foreign-
produced components in its manufacturing industries. The Shenzhen SEZ has a more 
advanced industrial structure than China and has developed into the high-tech hub of the 
country. China´s process of industrial upgrading does not strictly resemble either a CAF or a 
CAD strategy, and one can point to how elements of both have been present in its industrial 
development. The industrial development of the Shenzhen SEZ has been more in line with a 
CAF strategy, and its government has been less interventionist, with industrial upgrading 
guided by its comparative advantages to a bigger extent. 
 
While a number of studies on the Chinese SEZs have been conducted, many of these are 
outdated and not very in-depth. As such, I believe my thesis presents new and valuable 
insight into how these zones contributed to China´s economic growth. I have not seen them 
linked to the debate on a CAD versus a CAF strategy anywhere else, and this makes it 
somewhat different from much other academic research. In have not had the time or space to 
conduct a more detailed study of the performance of the different SEZs. Both how the four 
initial zones have performed, and also how other types of zones later established have 
contributed to China´s economic growth, are interesting features in the Chinese economic 
growth process. A more detailed comparison of various SEZs and economic zones, and an 
analysis of global value chains and the role domestic versus imported content play in Chinese 
manufacturing and exports, is something that would be valuable additions to the existing 
academic work on the Chinese economy. 
 
The most important thing is nonetheless that research on China continues in the future, as this 
will enable us to understand the important role it is currently playing, and will continue to 
play in the years to come. 
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